Well, it's a good thing we have put all those barbaric practices behind us.
I like all the numerated features, but what of those conditions outside the fascist country's borders? Do these political extremes arise when times are good? Do they arise because the distribution of global goods is uneven, excessively uneven, provocatively uneven? Is there always a central, pivotal country whose changing fortunes may precipitate policies that cultivate the fascist incubation in these other countries? Does the Nazi movement in Germany get its cues from understated fascist movements, features, practices that reside in Britain, or the US?
Ok, I'm sure these are all answered in the next installments, but I need to make you think that I am responding and not just another ardent follower enduring the tough times.

Posted by: calmo at February 14, 2006 03:08 AM

Thanks for stopping by Calmo.

But what of those conditions outside the fascist country's borders?

Not sure I understand this. Do you mean, what about attributes of fascism that the fascist regime inflicts abroad? Such as, for example, the result of invading another country and doing something characteristically fascist there?

Do these political extremes arise when times are good?

Surprisingly enough, yes, often they do. For example, the appointment of Hitler to the Chancellorship, Mussolini to the Premiership, and the liquidation of civilian rule in Japan all occurred at periods of impressive economic performance by the civilian administration.

An analogy may be drawn to bankruptcy. Bankruptcies actually increase after a recession, partly because it's not usually the economic decline that causes business failure, but a prolonged slump. After 18 months, the economy may have recovered, but those 18 months are the actual wound from which many businesses cannot recover, not the first 6 months when the economy is contracting. The other part explains why businesses fail well into a recovery: first, the optimism-inducing conditions of recovery still represent depressed business activity, and second, during the period of recession all of the institutions show a measure of patience and solidarity not present during recovery.

The crisis of 1926-1929 (export recession) and 1930-32 (foreign financial collapse) were over; the indemnities of Versailles were a dead letter; the reichsmark was on a sound footing once more and most of Germany's export markets were recovering. Likewise, the most intense (albeit short-lived) depression in Italian history was over, when Mussolini's party won a pathetic 35 seats in the parliament. Still, the impasse in Italy between [neo]liberals and [clerical] conservatives was too frustrating for the extremely close-knit aristocracy, and the King appointed Mussolini PM. Mussolini actually seized power after a scandal arising from the murder of Matteoti (author of The Fascists Exposed!).

My point is, the economies of these countries were on the mend, the worst of the diplomatic crises were over, and inflationary episodes had been resolved by liberal democrats. In contrast, the famous fascist regimes each made a serious & humilating blunder right after achieving executive power, and then liquidated all checks on their power. In all cases, by then it was too late.

Is there always a central, pivotal country whose changing fortunes may precipitate policies that cultivate the fascist incubation in these other countries?

Yes, there usually is. I have some recondite theories about this; I proposed the existence of a TEP, and explained its role in the World Wars. I should hasten to add that I am an amateur and dilettant, and this is merely my opinion. But it explains a good many things. The TEP's main role is to explain the transmission mechanism between imperialism and fascism or totalitarianism, which I think is something missing in either Arendt or Lindqvist.

Posted by: James R MacLean at February 14, 2006 07:01 AM