This post has to begin with a twist: the Sixth Arab-Israel War began in May this year, not in mid-July; and it began, as wars usually do, with practically nihilistic posturing between rival political factions to advertize their toughness. The result, to put the matter plainly, may be seen above. That, ladies and gentlemen, is pretty much all that is achieved by it.

First, I would like to include some disclaimers. All of the Palestinian or Lebanese websites I have seen, where the obvious reality of imperialism is expressed, have been spammed by totalitarian vandals. A simple example will suffice: here's one Leila, in Gaza, who posted a photo of a concrete block that struck a girl's head and killed her during an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) shelling of a residential flat. The block, naturally, is smeared with dried blood. Three spam comments (the same three "persons") appeared in many of the comments section, all throwing the "two wrongs make a right" slogan in her face. I noticed these same three spams in many of the Palestinians' photoblogs, if not all of them. Another Leila, this one in Lebanon (see comments), a friend, former neighbor, and epiphany of gentle forebearance, referred readers to an article by Jonathan Edelstein on why international law matters. Mr. Edelstein is, generally speaking, highly sympathetic to the motives and concerns of Israel, but he wanted to clarify the relevence of legality to warfare. Sure enough, a pompous babbler crammed her comments with the usual buffet of militaristic slogans and other psychopathology. If anyone takes a notion to do that to this site, I shall ban them and delete their comments.

In January this year, the "Islamicist" party Hamas won elections, sweeping the hardline movement to authority in the Occupied Territories of (BBC). But in much of the territories, electoral victory did not translate to power; the Quartet of world powers, the EU, US, UN, and Russia agreed to freeze the assets of the organization despite the already-grievous humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip (CSM), and although Hamas was generally acknowledged as more accountable and disciplined than the famously corrupt Fatah (CSM).

Of course, Fatah had signed agreements acknowledging Israel's right to exist, in exchange for what was to have been a bogus peace agreement. Please bear in mind that the Palestinian groups lack for any other form of leverage over their massively more powerful and connected interlocutor: the Western powrs can, and did, "outwit" the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority under extreme duress. What agreements the Palestinian Authority was able to reach with Israel, such as over the alloction of water resources, was to prove merely another tool for creating splits between the PA and the Palestinians themselves. So it is understandable that Hamas was determined to exact far more from Israel before it conceded the one thing it had left: official acceptance of Israel.

Hamas has lost a very large number of leaders to IDF air attacks, owing to its prolonged suicide bombing campaign against the Israeli population. In my opinion, Hamas was ideologically constrained to tactics such as it used, and of course the Israeli government was likewise ideologically constrained; neither side could relent, given the position it or its supporters (and adversaries) had backed it into. I think this interpretation is very generous towards Israel, but I propose to accept it for the sake of exposition.

Hamas was, plainly, the legitimate governing party of the PA; the Quartet connived with Fatah to prevent Hamas from taking office (CSM). ¹ Within a few weeks the Gaza Strip was under Hamas control, while the West Bank was under Fatah's illegal, but internationally recognized, rule. At the same time, for having voted for the wrong party, the Gaza population was now under direct sanctions of food, water, and access to employment. A society of over 1.4 million persons was deprived of virtually every fundamental human need so that it would accept a Fatah coup. Seen in this light, the perception that democratic, peaceful measures were categorically doomed is highly understandable. If ever there was a textbook example of what William Blum called "killing hope," this was it. For the highly stratefied population of the Gaza Strip, the human crisis mounted swiftly.

This was not accidental. American and Israeli strategists were well aware of the effects of such strain of the fabric of a society. A decade of sanctions against Iraq had not challenged that regime's totalitarian state, but had completed the process of entirely nebulizing Iraqi civil society. In the Gaza Strip, splinter factions decided that the time for a final confrontation with Israel was nigh, and began launching rockets towards Sdiriot, an Israeli town nearby. According to B'Tsalem, 13 civilians were killed by the rockets. HRW confirms that the rockets were not fired by Hamas-affiliated groups; it seems reasonable to surmise that this is an ongoing example of terrorist attacks against civilians that have distinguished the 3rd (2000-present) intifada. The IDF response was unsurprising: as early as February, it was shelling the GS in retaliation. HRW cites a figure of 47 Palestinians killed, implying that 40 more Palestinians were killed by the miniature civil war among Fatah, Hamas, and the splinter groups launching the rockets.

While it may sound strange to hear of the PLO and Israel on the same side of a shooting war, the Fatah-Israel relationship was also extremely tense. IDF troops made repeated incursions into the West Bank, including one in Ramallah that killed 3 Palestinians (24 May-CBC); earlier, in March, a huge contingent of IDF troops and tanks stormed a prison in Jericho in order to seize seven alleged assassins. Openly, Mahmoud Abbas (PA President-Fatah) denounced the cutff of assistance, presumably because it was embassing to be allied with Israel against an electorate that only just rejected one's party. On the 8th and 9th of June, the IDF fired missiles at Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, possibly in retaliation for a car bombing in Tel Aviv. On the 10th, Hamas broke its ceasefire. The war was on.

Much has been made of Syria's support for Khalid Meshal, leader of the Syrian wing of Hamas. Although his relations with Gaza leaders Ismail Haniyah and Mahmoud al-Zahar have been strained, I haven't encountered compelling evidence of a rupture between them. There may, of course, now be different roadmaps for the two branches in restoring unity amongs the defecting branches of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Initially the IDF responded by a campaign of shelling; on the 27th of June, after a tunnel raid by Hamas fighters in which two IDF soldiers were killed and a third captured, the assault began.

(Part 2)

ADDITIONAL READING: Dove's Eye View (1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8); Head Heeb (1,2,3,4; also, "Why international law mattters"); Angry Arab; Abu Aadvark (1, 2,3); Lebanese Political Journal; Arab Media (new); Beirut Under Seige (new).

Daily Star (Beirut); al-Ahram (Cairo);

Articles in Salon (free with a brief advert):

• "Gaza melts down," 24 May


• "Lebanon pays for Hezbollah's sins," 14 July


• "Israel has decided to put a final stop to Hezbollah...," 19 July


• "Killing a nation, one airstrike at a time," 20 July


• "Hunkered down in Israel, again," 21 July

Photos: Flickr has albums by Israelis and Arabs: Laila El-Haddad (Gaza Girl), who also writes Raising Yousuf; Boris Joseph; Palestinian Pictures and Cartoons Photos; Matthew Good; Arabist