In my previous post, I focused on the IDF response to Gaza-launched rockets. In that post, I made what some might find a disturbing claim, viz., that the morality of both militant acts against Israeli civilians, and IDF retaliation against Palestinian population, was determined by prospects for a favorable outcome. A favorable outcome was a necessary, but not sufficient, requirement for either belligerent's actions to be morally defensible. Certain notable commentators have gushed rapturously about the glorious achievement of Hizbullah in inflicting a humiliation on Israel, then—in the same breath, so to speak—thundered against the invasion of Lebanon as if a national government were supposed to respond to a serious humiliation (i.e., one that seriously threatened its credibility as a defender of its own population) with helpless capitulation. This is evidence of the sort of cognative delusion that takes over when many editorialists write about Arab-Israeli conflicts.

Of course, the problem with all of the actors is that they are behaving as if they had not thought anything through. Hizbullah might have imagined that it would readily win its detainees back from Israeli jails, but this seems unlikely; its attack on Israel was demonstrably contrived to force a confrontation, but for something of value only to Hizbullah, rather than something that concerns other Arabs. While Lebanese will no doubt blame Israel the most for the passion of Lebanon, they will also remember that Hizbullah has become quite similar to Israel in that it holds the lives of its own fighters to be worth those of hundreds of ordinary Lebanese. Like Paris of the Iliad, Hizbullah never consulted Troy about the abduction of Helen.

Even more blatant is the Israeli cabinet's response, which seems to be driven by sheer blind rage. The IDF had occupied southern Lebanon for 18 years; most of the time it was in pursuit of Hizbullah using air strikes and shelling. Most would agree that, despite the immense "investment" of blood and treasure, Israel was driven from its buffer zone with a severe loss of defense credibility. The professed goal of restoring the country's "deterrent credility" (by uprooting the entire population of Lebanon south of the Litani River) will do the opposite: it will prove the inherent weakness of Israel, and its inability to overcome this weakness. Friday the IDF withdrew from the Gaza Strip minus Corporal Shalit. It leaves archenemy Hamas united with "peace partner" Fatah in the national project of launching irritating little missiles at civilian settlements; despite a massive campaign of physical destruction, once again reducing the peace-loving Arab middle classes to destitution and rage, no tactical or strategic benefits have been achieved.

Cordesman (linked below) believes that Hizbullah will suffer as a result of launching the lopsided "war" with Israel; Scott Harrop (JWN) implicitly attacks this notion, but evidently on the grounds that Lebanese will resent Israel and the USA more. I lack the personal experience of Ms. Cobban (JWN), who makes the point a little more explicitly; but I think it's not so that loathing of Israel translates directly into glory for Hizbullah. It's possible for a population to resent both a local party with a minority constituency imposing its agenda, and the foreign power that actually carries out the destruction. The endless circles of recrimination that JWN comment threads invariably degenerate into, usually involve partisans of the two sides insisting the side they are defending is entirely reasonable and easy to reach peace with.

For those who insist that the entire misery and suffering of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the fault of the Israelis being perverse, I would recommend the startling counterargument provided by Franz Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth. I say startling, because Fanon would be anxious to characterize himself as being as hostile to the State of Israel as it is possible to be. And yet, his ground-breaking analysis of wars of national liberation draws heavily on his experience fighting for, and providing psychiatric assistance to, the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria's War of Independence. I apologize for not having the book handy, but a general theme of the book is the intransigent fury that such movements harbor towards the enemy. Fanon admires and encourages this fury, believing that, even if it is futile for political liberation, it does liberate the subject people spiritually. He does not glamorize it; indeed, he mentions that the rebel yearns to replace the oppressor entirely, including in his capacity as a private citizen (i.e., to reverse roles, to even expropriate the legitimate possessions of the enemy citizen) and to take vengeance explicitly on innocent members of the population.

That is, of course, Fanon; and not everything Fanon says was accurate. He did appear to be conflicted about the fact that he had been "colonized" to the extent that he was essentially a Frenchman and would remain one no matter what, so his fury had no pospect of release. Many former colonies, including those of the Arab world, are profusely (if ambivalently) devoted to the culture of their former colonial masters.¹ However, his point is well-taken: the fact that Arab resistance to Israel takes extremely ugly forms at times, does not negate the suffering Arabs have endured at its hands.

I am not in a position to lecture Nazrallah or Olmert, whom I regard as slaves of arrogance. I certainly would have little hope budging the extreme positions of most commentators on this war; indeed, I confess I would prefer not to encounter any. One of my dearest friends is trapped in Lebanon (?) right now; many others are Lebanese, Palestinian, and Israeli. My friends include IDF veterans, young and old; and also an ardent Hamas supporter. As for the pretensions of political parties or demagogues to speak for their people, I am especially skeptical. It's impossible for me to take seriously the notion that any good can come of collective punishment, or immiserating the population of Lebanon in lieu of hitting "high-value targets" belonging to Hizbullah. It's impossible for me to take seriously the idea that the political elites of my own country (the USA) have any regard for the well-being of its citizens or any long-term vision worthy of the name. The general pattern of massive political dysfunction in the USA is followed, albeit at a distance, by similar meltdowns in the rest of the world.

Certainly the US leadership (so to speak) has a heavy burden of responsibility for the utter implosion of any vision or state responsibility in the Levant. Past remarks by Bush suggest that he thinks the most important thing is ever-more ferocious punishment of the Arab world until it accepts the neoconservative vision.² Any sentiment incongruent with this idea is attacked as moral temporizing. But the outcome has been an extremely rapid degradation of remaining US influence in the region. The fanaticism that had served as a substitute for clarity in our Middle Eastern policy has forced the regional actors to make faustian bargains: make a short-term bargain with Washington and it will accommodate you as long as nothing better comes along. Refuse, and as self-destructive as it is, the US government will at once commence to count down to war. Like a drunken sailor waving wads of cash in one hand and his sidearm in the other, it cannot last long before he swoons and his victims take their revenge. But while he is standing, those who cannot escape his attention, or those who are unscrupulous, will do as he demands.

In my analogy, the traditional self-discipline and moderation usually pursued by great powers tended to limit it. Countries were less likely to make pacts unless they were on dignified terms, since the State Department put a premium on the use of force. The war in Iraq was a staggering waste of military and diplomatic assets; enabling the Likud/Kadima during the intifada has been another, and of course this is another. If the men running the White House were keeping an eye on the ability of our government to keep up this same degree and scope of hawkishness, then of course they would be eager to take a far more dovish tone. Unwilling to do that, the rememdy has been to constantly raise the stakes on every diplomatic confrontation. Nations like Syria or Egypt know it is only a matter of time before our hegemonic assets are squandered completely, but in the meantime they don't dare confront the USA directly; they have to placate the neoconservative cult right now. What will happen when this process of squandering the USA into defenselessness is finished? Then, of course, we will get to run the geopolitical gauntlet, with everyone scrambling to get in line so they can ostentatiously kick us in the shin.

ADDENDUM (2 August 2006): Prometheus6 drew my attention to "Hizbullah's attacks stem from Israeli incursions into Lebanon" Anders Strindberg (CSM), which in my view sheds very important new light on the current war. Citing UN reports of ceasefire violations by the IDF, Mr. Strindberg writes:

As pundits and policymakers scramble to explain events in Lebanon, their conclusions are virtually unanimous: Hizbullah created this crisis. Israel is defending itself. The underlying problem is Arab extremism.

Sadly, this is pure analytical nonsense. Hizbullah's capture of two Israeli soldiers on July 12 was a direct result of Israel's silent but unrelenting aggression against Lebanon, which in turn is part of a six-decades long Arab-Israeli conflict.

Since its withdrawal of occupation forces from southern Lebanon in May 2000, Israel has violated the United Nations-monitored "blue line" on an almost daily basis, according to UN reports. Hizbullah's military doctrine, articulated in the early 1990s, states that it will fire Katyusha rockets into Israel only in response to Israeli attacks on Lebanese civilians or Hizbullah's leadership; this indeed has been the pattern.

ADDITIONAL READING: "Road to Nowhere: Strategic Failures in Lebanon" (PDF) Anthony Cordesman, CSIS (July 2006)

2 Some may find this judgment of Pres. George W. Bush excessively harsh. While I think it is self-evident, former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill mentions it in this passage:

Within three months at his post, O'Neill was informed by his colleagues that "the president shouldn't be expected to read reports." And that tactic showed. Consider Bush's take on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. "'We [Bush and Ariel Sharon] flew over the Palestinian camps. ... Looked really bad down there. ... I think it's time to pull out of the situation.' ... 'The consequences of that could be dire,' [Powell] said, "especially for the Palestinians.' "Bush shrugged. 'Maybe that's the best way to get things back in the balance.' "Powell seemed startled. 'Sometimes a show of strength by one side can really clarify things,' Bush said. He turned to Rice. 'So Condi, what are we going to talk about today?" The remark is so flip, he just as easily have asked, "So Condi, how about some Mozart?"
[The Price of Loyalty, Ron Suskind]