On EDSA-Style Movements

March 27, 2005

EDSA: Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Manilla, RP; the name given to the massive demonstations that ousted Ferdinand Marcos (1986) and Joseph Estrada (2001). In 2006 I expect a flurry of research and popular nonfiction on EDSA-style movements (ESM; or, formally, a change of political power stimulated or catalyzed by massive demonstrations). In part, this is because it's become so common: in Kyrgyzstan, in Lebanon, in Bolivia, in Ukraine, in Georgia, in Serbia, and so on. However, another good reason is that ESM-risk is likely to become an issue for capital markets and diplomacy. Another is that ESMs are likely to be a criterion for judging the success or failure of Pres. Bush's stated objective of propagating democracy worldwide.

I don't like the term "people power" because it implies that ESMs are somehow uniquely democratic. They aren't; for example, after EDSA 2 ousted Pres. Joseph Estrada of the Philippines, a lot of observers noticed the so-called people-power movements were really a case of sectional interests asserting their peculiar veto on the executive. Marcos had not been a legitimate president of his country since 1972; Joseph Estrada definitely was.

I also believe the term "revolution" has been abused in this way. In most of these cases, the ESM amounted to making the system stop; the system resumed when the personnel at the very top resigned. In a revolution, the system itself would either be replaced by a new one, or else altered to the extent that the political class would not exert pressure on the executive to resign. In the case of Ukraine, for example, Pres. Kuchma was obligated to de-certify the outcome of the elections in order to restore a functioning state. In a true revolution, Kuchma would not be able to restore the functioning state at all. In a few cases, where the executive simply leaves, he probably does so because the real political elites have withdrawn support.

The prototypical EDSA (1986) was a radical change, but one often notices a dissatisfaction on the part of Philippinos who lived through it. It was certainly a special case of an ESM because it was so very huge, but it was made possible because so many elites decided Marcos had become a liability. The survival of figures in Philippine politics such as Ponce Enrile and Fidel Ramos, both of whom were implicated in Marco's repression, suggests that EDSA was not so much a revolution at all so much as a strike that caused the political establishment to come to terms with other sections of Philippine society. In the case of Georgia, there's little evidence that the political changes of November 2003 are sufficiently drastic to constitute a revolution, although Muscovite influence over Tbilisi clearly suffered a severe blow. Unless Georgia enjoys a dramatic increase in trade with neighbors other than Russia, however, I suspect it will simply drift back into Moscow's orbit.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

It's my view that ESMs will increase in frequency, and often be directed at governments established by successful ESMs. The most obvious example is in Lebanon; while Omar Karami is still [acting] Prime Minister of Lebanon, the "Red & White Revolution" that supposedly "ousted" him was offset by massive pro-Syrian demonstrations. For those with no particular ideological ax to grind, the lesson is clear: "pro-Syrian" and "anti-Syrian" factions are really just rival sections of Lebanese society, and the invective against Syria is nothing more than mythmaking; the "anti-Syrians" are really just imagining that, had Syria never interfered in their politics, they would still be in charge. That, of course, implies that they are the "natural" elites of Lebanon. However, the wave of the future is, I suspect, greatly increased transnational influence; in the future, all countries will be like Lebanon.

In addition to competing ESMs, I expect increased efforts by intelligence agencies to launch ESMs either at home or abroad; ESMs to become an irresistible way of minority veto; and increased use of m-commerce (PDA's, mobile phones, broadband internet) to expedite ESMs across all categories of populations. The "digital divide" notwithstanding, I expect informal sector users of cell phones, such as unregistered private buses, or media "pirates" to use ESM as a method of combatting unilateral actions by urban governments against them. On the other hand, this will be an issue of concern to multilateral international lenders, such as the World Bank Group, or the Asian Development Bank. ESMs will definitely make it harder for countries like Venezuela to tax wealthy populations to repair decaying infrastructure, but will also make it harder for conservative governments to take aggressive action against ballooning external debt.

What this means, I suppose, is that the old divide between enterprise, corporate sector, and informal sector that prevails in much of the 3rd world will cease to apply. While the corporate sector is a global free rider, has been for decades, and will be for at least another decade, I think we may actually see the emergence of a fourth sector I propose to call the Standing ESM (SESM), or perhaps the Permanent ESM (PESM). The PESM is, unfortunately, not likely to develop smoothly into a democratic movement; demonstrations are actually not a democratic way of managing policy at all. On the other hand, governments remain captives of corporations, and are likely to become even more so in the future. The informal sector, of course, is the leading urban employer in most third world countries and will probably grow in relative importance as urban populations mushroom. Even in the People's Republic of China, with its gigantic trade surpluses, there is a push of workers into the informal sector both from the imploding farm sector and job losses in industry.

So I expect the PESM, unsatisfactory though it may be, to become the future space for civil interaction. This will be a very unsatisfactory way for a long time, but it will probably tend to function mainly as an ancillary to more established forms of social organization. For example, I expect many countries to adopt associational politics like you see in polemical "web logs." The quality of discourse is actually quite poor, but as people become more attuned and less gullible, that will improve.

Incidentally, has anyone noticed how frequently ESMs replace relatively moderate leaders like Omar Karami with hardliners like Nabih Berri?

ADDENDUM: (29 March 2005) Jonathan Edelstein (the Head Heeb) features a wrap-up of these movements, including some mention of developments in Somaliland (please see Geeska Africa) and Bahrain I'd overlooked entirely (please see Chanad Bahraini). Jonathan also speculates on future ESMs, including on in Haiti. On 13 November of this year, Haitians will go to polls for the first rouund of presidential voting; since Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected with a vast majority (2001), and ousted by foriegn intervention, I expect the opponents of his Lavalas Party will have to resort to their customary fraud and intimidation in order to avoid another landslide.