Some Important EU Institutions

October 22, 2005

[ 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 ]

INSTITUTIONS

There are four governing branches of the European Union:

1. The European Parliament
2. The European Commission
3. The Council of Ministers
4. The European Court of Justice

In addition to these four bodies, there are the Court of Auditors, the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Economic and Social Committee, Committee of the Regions, the European Investment Bank, the European Ombudsman, and the European Data Protection Supervisor. I will probably need to address these in another post. 1. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

With the election of members directly (beginning 1979), the EP now had status as the most compelling force in trans-European politics. It soon acquired control over the EC's modest budget, legislative powers, and supervision over the European Commission (see below). All of these powers seem to have been asserted gradually; for example, the first real assertion of EP authority over the Commission was in 1999, when the entire body was sacked for corruption. It's rather disturbing that the EP, even after 26 years, had to threaten to veto the entire commission in order to show its displeasure with Buttilgione. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) awarded significantly more power over the budget, but even then only half: the half not under the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). The CAP is entirely under the control of the Council of Ministers (see below). As for the laws: in practice, the EP does not go against the will of the Council of Ministers, and in fact appears to confine itself chiefly to passing legislation approved by the latter.

The EU Parliament Building in Strausburg

Still, the Parliament is evolving; and while there have substantial delays in the implementation of a responsible parliament that actually had a convincing legislative role, one may reasonably insist that it is merely a matter of time before one is achieved. For one thing, there is the cycle of admission, euphoria, disillusion, and realism (rather like immigration to a new country, actually). Initially, countries are eager to join the EU; during the negotiations for admission, as the population reads about monetary stability conditions and fiscal obligations, support diminishes, and after admission most countries experience a recession. Support plummets. Then, returns begin to drift in. Compliance with EU regulations makes the nation's business institutions more trustworthy, and capital markets deepen. The country's elected representatives are appointed to trans-European institutions; in a short time, their PM assumes the Presidency and voters sense that they are now part of something very large. They become proud of the EU.

It seems to me also that the administrators in Brussels need to learn some obvious logical constraints about EU governance. The Constitution, for example, was designed for passage not by referendum, nor even by the free deliberation of the MEPs in Brussels; no, the object was to pass this like an immensely complex act through the Council of Ministers. The resulting document was far too long and vague to have any sort of organic relationship to politics, and possibly too much so for reliable, stable interpretations by the European Court of Justice. Moreover, it enshrined decisions for all future parliaments in the Constitution itself, as if the Council of Ministers wanted to prevent any institution of popular sovereignty from ever having a hand in governing the EU.
The EU Parliament Building in Brussels

I mentioned the EU presidency above; there are three presidents in the EU, one of the Commission (who serves for five years); one of the Council; and one of the parliament (who serves six months). Quite often the president of the parliament is referred to by nationality, rather than by name; hence, the EU presidency is now held by the UK. This position is not held by an MEP, but by the country's prime minister. However, the president's powers are actually quite small.

The EP may be likened to the lower house of a federal congress: the upper house is the house of nations, while the lower is the house of peoples (the Soviet legislature used precisely this wording). The two houses exist to balance the rival claims of small states and big ones. However, in the case of the EU, the lower house is still exceptionally weak, whereas in member states where there are two houses, the lower house typically holds most of the power. In a future post, I propose to discuss the organic implications of this for the Union.

A final note: readers might be confused because I have three photos of the EU parliamentary offices, two in Strasbourg and one in Brussels. The one in Strasbourg is used because of a quirk in the rules that require the EP to meet there four days out of the year; it was completed in 1999 and was ordered by the Strasbourg mayor.

2. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

The EU Commission Building in Brussels

The European Commission is responsible for safeguarding multilateral treaties of the EU, or treaties between the EU and other countries.² The Commissioners are appointed to portfolios, one commissioner from each country (earlier, the distribution favored countries with large populations). EU commissioners are also empowered to initiate legislation. It seems to me they are analogous to the committees of the US Congress, or more precisely, the chairs of those committees. However, they also correspond loosely to the ministers of a cabinet.

The Commission was created in 1967 with the "fusion" of the EEC, the ECSC, and Euratom into the new EC. Commissioners are appointed for five years, en bloc; the prime minister of EU member states appoint the commissioner for the portfolio they have been awarded; so, for example, the EU commissioner for external affairs, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, was chosen by the PM of Austria, Wolfgang Schüssel (logically, as it happened: she had served in the same position for Austria).

In 1999, Paul van Buitenen accused the Commission (in particular, Edith Cresson) of massive corruption and abuse of power; Cresson defended herself by insisting that all commissioners behaved the same way. Hence, the commissioners were obligated to resign en bloc.³ According to the linked paper, van Buitenen's report exposing the Santer Commission was itself a salvo in a protracted battle between the EP and the Commission over the implementation of the budget; Commission President Jacques Santer believed the EP could not meaningfully challenge him. Hence, '99 was to prove a milestone in the EP's emergence as an organ of accountability (or, perhaps, would not; all of the commissioners were appointed by their respective PMs, which meant they were all from the parties in power in their respective countries; the MEP's, likewise, represented the approximate political groupings of their home countries. The linkage was not exact, and MEPs had to weigh their loyalty to their PM's appointee against the damage the Santer Commission was doing to the projection of European integration).

However, in most cases the Commission is more a bully pulpit for the measures the EU undertakes. For example, the previous Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy (France-Socialist) was in constant confrontation with the US Department of Commerce; he had a career of publicizing his party as a guardian of Europe against a malignant USA (by driving US products from all markets), and cultivated a broad strategy of making his struggle that of the UN. As a result, in addition to a broad range of urgent or beneficial international treaties (Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and many others) that the Bush Administration has either repudiated or rejected, the EU and allied at the UN have pushed measures intended to directly attack US economic interest; the object is ensure that only the USA bears any pressure for its economic transactions with the rest of the world (e.g., the soi-disant "Cultural Diversity Agreement"). He also pushed a measure that would tie access to the massive EU market to rejection of US agricultural exports. However, this was not Lamy the evil genius; this was part of a huge, comprehensive program on the part of the EU to tie its own industrial policies to a grand trade offensive against the USA. It generally reflected the constant pressure of NGOs on the EU Council of Ministers and the foreign ministries of member states; if prevailing European industrial interests were harmed by such-and-such a measure, no legislation would appear; if not, the EU's awesome diplomatic efforts kicked into high gear.

The Commission's composition swing hard to the right in 2004, reflecting the members' conservative political realignment (between '99 and '04, of course; Austria, France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy embraced conservative governments, while many of the 10 new countries of the EU, such as Hungary, Malta, Cyprus, and Slovakia had pro-business governments). It appeared therefore that the Commission would back away from its militancy, but to no avail; the reason, of course, is that the business institutions of the EU were always driving this trade war, not any "social" institution. This has probably contributed to spillovers in all other matters of international relations or even internal governance, since the EU Commission has sought to use the UN Secretariat and General Assembly as a sort of backup for its own initiatives [*]. By establishing a principle as global, rather than "merely" European, the Commission can practically decree the moral high ground, creating a veritable ticker-tape parade of international measures and conventions that the US cannot possibly ratify.

I want to stress there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the EU Commission using the UN as a global megaphone; the EU has "earned" its power by very prudent donations to governments in former colonies.⁴ However, for those observing the late mania for global protocols and conventions, this is an important part of the story: the EU Commission appears to believe it benefits from a politically isolated USA, and also benefits from having its latest trends in legislation enshrined as the global standard. For many reasons, I believe this is harmful and needs to be recognized as running counter to the best interests of everyone.

(Someone may feel the need to point out that the US government, since long before GW Bush, has allowed this situation to spin out of control by tightly embracing a very narrow cross-section of US industrial interests; I am well aware of this.)

3. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

The EU Council Building in Brussels

The Council of Ministers (ECM) is the actual governing body in the EU.⁵ Constitutional analysts liken it to the upper body of a federal constitution, the one representing the interests of the states. With its overwhelming preponderance of power, and its indirect link to the electorate (through member governments), it can be likened to the early US Senate.

Oddly enough, it is nonetheless one of the more recent institutions. Of course ministers of comparable portfolios had been meeting for years; the agricultural ministers of all six member states might occasionally meet for some summit on the Common Agricultural Program (CAP). However, the ECM was first formally acknowledged in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (that also created the "European Union"). Much of the early history of the ECM was deliberately downplayed, as in fact it was inherently informal: part of the reason was that a formal system of deciding EC business posed the risk of confrontation and defeat, something that might have derailed the close personal friendships between the [West] German chancellor and the French president.

The ECM must not be confused with the European Council (EUC) and the Council of Europe. The EUC formally consists of the heads of state and the governments; the ECM consists of their representatives, which have a formal system of deciding issues and passing legislation. The Council of Europe (COE) is not affiliated with the EU and has a far larger membership; it was founded in 1949 and is affiliated with the European Court of Human Rights. The Council, like the Parliament, has a six month presidency; the president is a country, not a person, and it's the same country as the EP's. In most countries, the word "president" means "one who presides"; the president of a European country is largely ceremonial, and he/she is seldom directly elected (in Israel and Italy, the PM is directly elected; the president is not). In the civil justice system of Continental Europe, the presiding judge is likely to be addressed as "president."

The ECM faced its first crisis in the early 1980's with pressures to act in response to the severe economic crisis. Under the pressure of that crisis, it developed a formal system of weighted voting, which is a compromise between pure proportional representation and one country-one vote. Should the EU develop a reliable system of rapidly implementing economic stimulus packages, the member states would then have to execute it, which poses a constraint (suppose the government of a member state decides to resist a decision of the ECM?). Also, the budget controlled by the ECM is actually quite small; half of it is dedicated to administration of the CAP.

Another item to consider is that, while the other EU institutions have a definite form and legal composition, the ECM has laws of motion (my phrase); it has guidelines and targets [*], and formal strategies of attacking a particular problem, but no fixed structure that I could discern. For example, earlier I mentioned the analogy of the ECM to the early Senate of the USA (before senators were directly elected); this was an analogy, not a simile. There is a system of voting also, but the process of discussion is the decisive factor in a political process as complex and fraught with language issues as the EU is. There are "subcouncils" involving, for example, councils of the ministerial liaisons of each portfolio for the member states; usually an issue remains in the subcouncil level and only in contentious issues will it rise to the "meso-level." The meso-level involves the involvement of the Commission for that department; this seems to contribute to "vote avoidance" (my phrase). "Vote avoidance" is useful because it prevents confrontation, winners or losers. It is problematic because it allows a determined and well-connected minority to exercise a sort of "Junta of the Obscure," a regime under which the political issues are extremely tedious and ambigous. Also, it evades tough decisions.

4. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

The EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg

The Court of Justice is loosely analogous to the US Supreme Court, with some important exceptions.⁶ First, there are two distinct legal traditions in the EU, and the common law tradition familiar to US nationals is a definite minority. Second, in addition to the CoJ's obvious job of enforcing community laws, it houses the "Court of the First Instance," which functions somewhat like the US Federal Court of Appeals; unlike the latter, however, there is only one court of the 1st Instance. Appeals on the basis of law go to the Court of Justice itself.

As I mentioned above, the ECJ is not the same thing as the European Court of Human Rights; the latter is an organ of the COE (see above). I find it fascinating that the European Commission (see above) is one of the main plaintiffs in ECJ cases against member states. This means one of the commissioners is constantly waging legal battles with other countries. Likewise, member states can be plaintiffs against the Commission (on the grounds it exceeded its authority). Finally, the Commission can resolve a question put to it, without a formal plaintiff and respondant.

SOURCES: Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society; Wikipedia History of the European Union & other listed topics; Archive of European Integration (AEI), University of Pittsburg; "The Structure of the EU," NATO; "An EU primer," Scottish Executive News; "History of the European Union" (PDF), hosted by the Parliament of the Rep. of Georgia.

NOTE: 1 "Introduction: The European Parliament..." (PDF), from The European Parliament and Supranational Party System, by Amie Kreppel, 2003; and "Steps Towards a Federal European Parliament" (PDF), by John Pinder, 2000.

2 "The EU Commission" website, Europa

3 "The resignation of the Santer-Commission: the impact of 'trust' and 'reputation'," Angelina Topan (via Wikipedia).

4 Not to belabor the point, but European external affairs tend to imitate many of the exploitative practices commonly observed on the part of the USA. This is not meant to absolve the US State Department or other organs of foreign policy, of course; but the near-universal belief among European nationals is that US is extraordinary in this respect. US nationals are likely to (a) approve, or at least, be gratified by, these practices; (b) deny them; (c) be ignorant of them; (d) deplore them vehemently, and wonder why the US is so perverse; (e) develop a sense of depressed cynicism; (f) believe that it's irrelevant what other countries do, it's their duty to attend to US sins. The last point of view has a lot of merit, but I find it most unfortunate that very few adopt the position that the US is part of a bigger system. This is the concept I would like to instill: there is a complex and vital interaction of institutions, and usually national character plays a very weak role in explaining human suffering.

I just completed Tropical Gangsters by Robert Klitgaard (1990), which I highly recommmend. It's about his work as a consultant for the government of Equatorial Guinea, assigned by his "employer", the World Bank. Unlike my normal reading, it's not academic; Mr. Klitgaard uses a very accessable style and freely admits to things he does not know. One of the elements of the book I found mildly surprising, was how uniformly predatory the international community was towards EG, even though in a majority of cases, the individuals involved had at least a shred of idealism and regard for the locals. Because EG is definitely outside the "US sphere of influence," the perpetrating institutions were largely non-US: Spanish, French, Russian, Chinese. Had Mr. Klitgaard been writing about Honduras rather than EG, then very likely the villains would have been overwhelmingly US nationals.

One distinctively European practice not mentioned in the book, but which I encountered when I was researching a revolution in Madagascar, was that of using aid packages forcefully to get the local authorities to favor the donor country's aid programs. EU member states usually exert their influence on recipient states "off-book," through a laundry list of conditions negotiated prior to the transfer of assistance. Recipients reliably vote with the donor in the General Assembly even on trivial issues and agree to exclude US products in some way. In Madagascar, Ratsiraka had almost entirely excluded all US products from the island; when he was ousted in an EDSA-style movement (ESM), his successor altered the trade regime to allow equal status to products from all countries. US imports, of course, sharply increased.

The EU website has a splendid page devoted to UN relations; the tone of the page is predictable: we, the EU, are in the vanguard of international cooperation and set the standard of civilized conduct. Here again, this cannot be criticized since it is pure due dilligence on the part of the EU External Affairs Commissioner and the EU Council, but past a certain level of moral triumphalism, one starts to wonder if this has a rather invidious purpose. It's rather like certain national governments that never miss an opportunity, no matter how contrived, to remind one that they took the side of virtue and freedom in World War Two.

5 "The Council of the European Union" website, Europa; I am also grateful for "Please don't call it a summit" (EU Referendum); also "Towards a Theory of the Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy," by Adrian Kay, 2000

6 "The Court of Justice of the European Communities"; website at Europa. The Wikipedia entries (ECJ; 1st instance) are exceptionally good.