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Pakistan Archive Peace InitiativeJanuary 05, 2004(Edited 6 Jan 2004)NEWSITEM: Indian and Pakistani leaders meet for first time since 2001 (Channel News Asia) Conrad Barwa, whose expertise on the India-Pakistan dispute utterly surpasses my own, had this to say in the comments section of Procrastination: I see no reason to start celebrating anytime soon. Vajpayee seems to go through these periodic bursts of trying to be seen to making some sort of breakthrough the problem is that it leads to heightened expectations where any subsequent failure is blamed on the other side (as was done after Agra) or lead to really pointless gestures that are ill-timed and tactical disaster (who can forget the bizarre unilateral Ramadan cease-fire?). There is some debate as to what exactly motivates these moves; some sort of intra-party struggle within the Sangh, or whether the ‘Vikas purush’ with his Nehruvian delusions has one beady on history and wants to chalk up one semi-decent accomplishment before he eats himself into an early grave. Either way, I can’t see any real progress unless there is a willingness on both sides to have some flexibility as opposed to just try and go through the motions. The Pakistani PM’s gesture is of more note; though I assume external constraints through the WoT have something to do with it here. Still we are only progressing to a stage that should have been reached much earlier, with the current crop of CBMs. at a relatively small level of significance.(CBM = "confidence building measure"; WoT = "War on Terrorism"; "Sangh" refers to the RSS and the Sangh Parivar-a federation of organizations comprising the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), its youth wing Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the Bajrang Dal and the frankly fascist Shiv Sena. Vikas Purush ["Development Man"] is a campaign epithet for PM Vajpayee. See Asia Times. Conrad's remark is really funny although Vajpayee, 79, is hardly at risk of an early grave-maybe an early gravy instead.) Ahmed Rashid on the Future of MusharrafApril 23, 2004One of the best journalists I've encountered is Ahmed Rashid (intro HC), who writes about Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf sharp turn away from restoring democratic rule in Pakistan (BBC). Lest Zack stop by and imagine I don't know this, I'll hasten to say I don't think Musharraf was ever likely to allow any institution to weaken the junker* class for whom, and by whom, Pakistan is ruled (Mr. Ajmal posted specifically on Pres. Musharraf here & here). Let's turn to Rashid and then discuss other reports. Rashid points to a number of startling heavy-handed (and conventional) measures in Pakistan. These don't merely include quelling opposition to Pakistan's volte-face on the Taliban, or bitterly unpopular operations in Waziristan against tribesmen harboring al-Qaeda guerrillas; nor yet the astonishing liberties extended to US federal agents inside Pakistani territory. These are probably well known to the reader.1The more "conventional" types of repression-thrashing run-of-the-mill parliamentary opponents rather than jerking his polity around to assist the GWoT-includes measures like jailing Javad Hashemi (23 years; "inciting mutiny") or micromanaging the conduct of parliamentary business. A loyal group of 18 members of the National Assembly have formally requested Musharraf to retain his control of the Pakistani armed forces whilst remaining president of the country-reneging, if so, on a promise to retire from active duty by December of this year.2 When Gen. Zia ul-Haq and Gen. Musharraf took over the country, they both appointed vast numbers of senior or retired military officers to administer the nation's civil service and parastatals. Unlike Zia ul-Haq, Musharraf has allowed the military staff to remain, so that the country remains under very highly militarized administration. Universities and state broadcasting services, for example, also remain under military supervision. In the meantime, branches of the government still run by civilians (like the Foreign Ministry) have been sidelined. Rashid points out that this has served the interests of his allies within the military, who are highly paid (an in a non-transparent society like Pakistan, have a stellar opportunity to enrich themselves through corruption). Rashid, perhaps because it seems like a digression at this point in history, fails to point out that Nawaz Sharif also presided over a sordid mess and achieved astonishing success in consolidating power. I mention this because I want to resist drawing the easy conclusions. Musharraf inherited the foreign policy of the junkers who actually rule Pakistan, as opposed to the urban middle class who tend to favor the PPP or the religious parties.3 Had Pakistan's middle classes not been utterly marginalized by the intimidation or seduction of their affiliated political leaders by successive juntas, then the junkers would have seen Pakistan industrialize at their expense; nationalism would have been far more potent in policies of the nation; militarism, however, would have been weaker and Pakistan's competition with India would have been more strongly business-oriented. Cooperation with the USA would have required far more compromise on the part of Washington. So Musharraf, who appears to have come late to the ISI (he became head of the armed forces in October '98, just one year before seizing political power, and was a brigader general before then), inherited its heavy reliance upon the Pentagon; it had won a good deal of leeway since the death of Zia ul-Haq, but was in a strategic position that evolved out of the Soviet withdrawal from the country and endless violence in Afghanistan (Jane's Defense). Musharraf took the logical step of attempting to build on the Taliban's victory while allowing other relations-except for the one with Saudi Arabia-to fester. When Bush fils came to office in '01, it was something of a windfall for him because the Riyadh-Islamabad Axis was now in the ascendency. The gamble appeared to have paid off, and as a consequence Musharraf made many promises to liberalize his country. After the 9/11 attacks, the shock to the junker-clergy alliance was not quite as sudden as it might have looked since there were already grave problems with the Taliban, and with the Pakistani clergy themselves. From where Musharraf stood it was plain that the clergy were not as powerful as they might have appeared to nervous Westerners-their poll results had always been pathetic, and they were deeply divided-and nothing short of a clear, vehement break with the kufr West would ever bring them to the side of the government. (In light of the previous sentence, we will assume for the moment that the West is unlikely to change itself sufficiently to propitiate the ulama anywhere.) In this light, and that of this analysis in The Dawn (Karachi), Musharraf seems to have been driven by necessity. Let us turn our attention now to an extremely intelligent, savvy analyst at whose site I often lurk: Zack Ajmal. From his site Procrastination I learn that Gen. Musharraf has appeared in HARDTalk (host: Riz Khan; Real Audio, text), a BBC interview format of extraordinary rigor. (That interview took place during a period of liberalization of the junta; since then, the "conventional" crackdown occurred, with the jailing of Javed Hashemi. Through Zack I learn that, since the 23 years imprisonment consists of six sentences to be served simultaneously, he's in jail for seven years, not 23. Still...), and he was tried in jail. Actually, I may as well let on here that I totally agree with Zack on all points-if this were not a quick and dirty essay, I would take better measures to make it not look like I'm going to debate some obscure point. In particular, I think Zack is correct in his analysis here, and merely because I criticized the civilian leaders of Pakistan-in particular, both Bhuttos-doesn't mean I think Musharraf is a decent antidote. I think he's showing his true colors as a power-hungry technocrat, albeit one with a charming personality. Zack observes that a lot of American observers think Musharraf is a tolerably clean, well-meaning Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938). Of course Atatürk has the appeal of having Europeanized and secularized Turkey in the '20's. But Turkey remained "secularized" after Kemal's and Inönü's death chiefly due to the popularity of the Kemalist regime with the urban middle class; this eventually grew in scope and affluence to serve, and be served by, a secular parliamentary republic. As Zack points out, Contrary to popular perception, Pakistan has a number of civic institutions and a much better political atmosphere than most Muslim countries. It also has numerous secular parties on the left and the right. Most people think the religious alliance (Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal or MMA) is the only opposition to Musharraf, but there are also the parties of the two former Prime Ministers, Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N and Benazir Bhutto’s PPP. They are both part of the anti-Musharraf alliance, ARD (Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy). PML-N got about the same number of votes (with a lot less seats because of first-past-the -post system) and PPP was second to the ruling PML-Q in the last election in number of seats but got more votes.Which was possible only of widespread anger at the US operations in Afghanistan. What about the possibility of an Islamist army coup in Pakistan? Zack explains that this is impossible because of the institutional cohesion of the Army; they speak with one voice and that voice isn't Islamicist. That by itself would not preclude a break with the past, especially since the ISI is widely perceived to have been infiltrated by al-Qaeda supporters, but the army is far too dependent upon the junker class; and Islamic interests have long been cynically manipulated. You could say Pakistani society has been innoculated against Islamicists since the clergy is viewed with considerable cynicism. That cynicism doesn't extend to the religion of Islam itself, of course; but even in the urban middle classes, the rowdy mullahs of Balochistan and the NWFP are viewed with scorn. In Iran, SAVAK prevented the mullahs from showing themselves to be pernicious louts. In Pakistan, that's about all they ever do.
Curiously enough, the main beneficiaries of this were the same junker-military alliance that had caused the misery in the first place. In '84 Altaf Hussain founded the MQM Party, which initially appeared to demand measures to reverse the economic and political decline of Pakistan's business middle class, and educated civil service-such as hiring quotas for mujahiris and anti-corruption measures. But it presently degenerated into a front for military management of dissent. In '88 it won NA elections held in the wake of Zia ul-Haq's assassination; then, in '91, as its power slipped, it launched a reign of terror in Karachi. The campaign of political murder raged through '95, with Karachi's murder rate surpassing that seen in El Salvador or Colombia. As MQM power became absolute within the state of Sindh, the national army seized MQM offices 19 June '92. Thereafter a highly coordinated campaign of intimidation and public condemnation of the MQM forced it underground. Much of the MQM violence was directed against Sindhi politicians and journalists (Sindhi is a distinct language from Urdu). After '95 the murder rate in Karachi fell dramatically and the city's economy boomed. (source: OnWar, "Sindhi-Muhajir Violence in Pakistan 1984-1992")
Concerning PakistanJanuary 02, 2005
In May 1999 Islamic militants from Pakistan (abetted by the ISI, it is widely believed) infilitrated Kargil and undertook guerrilla actions against the Indian-controlled portion of Jammu & Kashmir. The Kargil Incident was analogous to the Bay of Pigs (with Pakistan as the USA and India as Cuba), in many ways-except that the head of government in Pakistan at the time, PM Nawaz Sharif, was allegedly kept in the dark about it (Procrastination; Zack is skeptical of Sharif's protestations) until the armies of the two countries were busy shelling each other across the Line of Control (BBC). By 11 July the fighting had stopped, and Pakistan's PM had bitterly antagonized the military-whose top brass had earlier engineered the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. In one of the most dramatic episodes of Pakistani history, the once-invulnerable PM Sharif entered a personal struggle with the Army Chief of Staff, sacked him, then tried to prevent an airline with him from landing at Karachi International Airport (12 Oct '99; Dawn). Later that day, Pakistan suffered its third coup since 1959 (BBC). In June the next year he declared himself president, then held elections (April '02) for a second term; these he won, although turnout was about 30% of the electorate.
After the 9/11 Attacks, Musharraf was suddenly an extremely important world leader. He quickly offered his assistance to the US government in the War on Terror, including cooperation in the liquidation of the Taliban government in Afghanistan he had helped to create.
(For more background on Musharraf and Pakistan's political mileau, please see "Ahmed Rashid on the Future of Musharraf," HC, 23 April '03; on security operations in the Wana Agency-in coordination with the US Armed Forces-please see "Pakistan's Tribal Areas 'Proto-Darfur'?")
Earlier, Pres. Musharraf had promised that he would resign as army chief of staff, restoring some element of balance on his authority. To the surprise of few, he has since reneged on that promise (BBC, Procrastination [1, 2]). This, as well as the revelations of Abdul Qadeer Khan's involvement in nuclear proliferation (BBC; FAS; Procrastination [1, 2, 3];) and Musharraf's caving into vocal support for the avaricious nuclear scientist (PBS), lead one to wonder what national aspiration of ours the White House could possibly be servinng when it received Pres. Musharraf and uncritically heaps praises on him (Dawn): "The parliament provided for means for him to do this. He has exercised that option and it is now a matter for the Pakistan people and the Pakistan parliament, which has already judged this, to make any other judgments they wish to make," said Mr. Powell.
As far as the US administration was concerned, it will continue to work with President Musharraf and the government of Pakistan, he added. Mr. Powell recalled that President Musharraf had earlier pledged to take his uniform off and retire from the army but later, "with the support of the parliament, decided that this would not be in the best interest of the country". |
