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Sudan Archive: Assessment of the Regime

May 29-30, 2004

(Part 2, 3, 4 , 5 & 6)

The Bashir regime is not an especially repressive one for individuals. Western television programs are available; likewise, the country has numerous Internet cafes. Oddly, despite the hostile relationship between Washington and Khartoum, the Voice of America maintains offices in Khartoum. Press censorship ended in Khartoum in 2002, although newspapers are constrained from enquiring too closely about jailed ex-Speaker Hassan al-Turabi. In the city of Khartoum, as is often the case, there is a great deal of freedom; for example, there are Christian churches in Khartoum, including Coptic and Anglican despite a decades-long sectarian war in the south.

Moreover, while oil and gas recovery are important, fast-growing sources of revenue, they can take only partial credit for the good performance of the Sudanese urban economy. About half of the country's GDP is agriculture, and this employs 80% of the workforce. However, Sudan is an extremely poor country. It has a population growth rate of 2.7%; 44% of the population is under 14; infant mortality is 64 per 1000 live births (about the same as Yemen, but far better than Chad, Mali, or Niger). Sudan's level of social services are actually surprisingly high; it has a literacy rate of 61% (50% for women). In addition to the University of Khartoum, there are 25 government universities throughout the country with over 125,000 students and 3,000 teaching staff. There are also 23 private universities and technical colleges, with some 38,000 students and over 400 teaching staff (DoS).

These points need to be made. The Sudanese government is not as repressive as North Korea's or that of the Taliban in Afghanistan. It's a poor, politically gridlocked state running a very poor country with inadequate rainfall or forest cover. The insurgency in the South was backed by Sudan's neighbors, Israel (in retaliation for Sudan's sanctuary to radical terrorist movements) and possibly other western nations. It seems reasonable to suspect the CIA has been supporting the SPLM/SPLA (as here), which is the main rebel group opposing Khartoum.

FAS: The principal insurgent faction is the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), a body created by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The SPLA was formed in 1983 when Lieutenant Colonel John Garang of the SPAF was sent to quell a mutiny in Bor of 500 southern troops who were resisting orders to be rotated to the north. Instead of ending the mutiny, Garang encouraged mutinies in other garrisons and set himself at the head of the rebellion against the Khartoum government. Garang, a Dinka born into a Christian family, had studied at Grinnell College, Iowa, and later returned to the United States to take a company commanders' course at Fort Benning, Georgia, and again to earn advanced economics degrees at Iowa State University. By 1986 the SPLA was estimated to have 12,500 adherents organized into twelve battalions and equipped with small arms and a few mortars. By 1989 the SPLA's strength had reached 20,000 to 30,000; by 1991 it was estimated at 50,000 to 60,000.

Since 1983, the SPLA has been divided into 3 main factions: the SPLA Torit faction led by John Garang; the SPLA Bahr-al-Ghazal faction led by Carabino Kuany Bol; and the South Sudan Independence Movement led by Rick Machar. These internal divisions have intensified fighting in the south, hampering any potential peace settlement. The SPLA remains the principal military force in the insurgency.

Sudan's Islamic regime is quite possibly not the monstrosity depicted by numerous aid groups, like Christian Solidarity International (CSI). In the meantime, the SPLA was fighting a war not only against Sudan's central government-which included bombing of pipelines and any other facilities-but also other opposition movements that have made peace with Khartoum. Another jaundiced view of the SPLA is presented here and here.

I am stuck, like other citizens, with what I read. The SPLA is not the entire opposition; other groups clearly were driven into armed opposition by authoritarian regimes; and al-Turabi's influence, which nominally ended in 2000 when he challenged Gen. Bashir, has always been decidedly pernicious-and powerful. On the other hand, evidence of ties of Sudan's government to terrorist groups like al-Qaeda remain flimsy; the villification of Sudan and attacks against it seem to have been a clear lapse of judgment or caution on the part of the Clinton Administration. Oddly enough, in this particular case the Bush Administration's behavior has been surprisingly benevolent, and in August 2001 agreed that "Sudan had made steps in the right direction" for lifting its listing as a state sponsor of terrorism.

(Clarifications)

Comments on this Post:

"The Bashir regime is not an especially repressive one for individuals. "

I'm sure the individuals in Darfur might take exception to this comment.

Posted by Brian at June 1, 2004 04:31 PM

The problem in Darfur is a battle between militia, which Khartoum doesn't really control. That's bad, no doubt about it; but conventional totalitarian repression it's not. Repression involves scrutiny and persecution by state agency (or organizations acting on behalf of the state; some would argue that Salvadoran and Colombian death squads were carrying out the will of the state--thus making those countries not only violent and reactionary, but repressive as well. But it's more reasonable to argue the Arab militia is responding to a longstanding climate of extreme Arab chauvinism in the area.)

Yes, of course the Sudanese state is a product of extreme chauvinism and other sordid features; but does Khartoum actually control these militia? Is Khartoum's own reaction that unusual for a fragmented country facing an insurgency? These are questions that aren't merely academic. If the Khartoum authorities get pressure in the form of "We don't really like you and we really think your regime should be liquidated--this might be just the thing that serves as a pretext," then things will unfold in a very ugly way.

In the unlikely event this isn't obvious, I really do not approve of the Bashir government and I approve of al-Turabi even less. If Bashir is ousted by foreign pressure, al-Turabi or one of his clones will be the next (actual) ruler of Sudan.

Posted by James R MacLean at June 1, 2004 06:42 PM

"The problem in Darfur is a battle between militia, which Khartoum doesn't really control."

By all accounts, the militias are both controlled and armed by Khartoum.

Posted by Brian at June 1, 2004 11:10 PM

If the Khartoum authorities get pressure in the form of "We don't really like you and we really think your regime should be liquidated--this might be just the thing that serves as a pretext," then things will unfold in a very ugly way.

As opposed to ... ?

Posted by Randy McDonald at June 5, 2004 04:43 PM

As opposed to far broader efforts to get the Khartoum gov't to end the bloodletting. By way of illustration--the conflict in Yugoslavia raged despite massive international condemnation, threats of intervention, and internal opposition to the Milosevic regime. The US invaded Panama, then defeated the Iraqi occupiers of Kuwait, and so forth. Why did the folks in Belgrade--or in the Bosnia Serb Republic--fail to take the hint? Because everyone assumed the EU and the US were already committed to the liquidation of Yugoslavia no matter what.

Invading Sudan and alienating a fifth of its territory might fail to put much of a dampener on Janjawid activity, there might be retaliation against the Arab minority, and foreign peacekeepers would be in the crossfire. The humanitarian crisis would spill over into Kordofan, and there would be an intensified jihad campaign against the West.

Posted by James R MacLean at June 6, 2004 01:03 AM

I'd argue that the wars in the former Yugoslavia were exacerbated by a lack of Western seriousness, by an evident Western unwillingness to actually stage an effective intervention (as opposed to simply watching and condemning, or just making air strikes and doing nothing on the ground).

Certainly, any kind of Western intervention on the ground in Sudan isn't likely, particularly after the events going on in Iraq. That doesn't mean it wouldn't be a good thing, jihadists and all. (If they want to kill you anyway, the threat increase decreases substantially.)

Posted by Randy McDonald at June 6, 2004 05:52 PM