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Côte d’Ivoire-3November 9, 2004[ 1 | 2 ]With France promising to have 2,500 troops in Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) by the end of [2002], the nation's civil war [was] increasingly taking on the appearance of a clash between old and new colonial powers. The old power, of course, [was] France, which held Côte d'Ivoire until independence in 1960. The new one is Libya. To borrow an odious phrase, whether or not Libya's junta was a player in the Ivoirian civil war was to become a detail of history. So far, more evidence has emerged that Pres. Gbagbo was trying to destabilize his neighbor Burkina Faso (HH). However, this points out another interesting aspect of modern African politics: the role of mercenaries (HC). Mercenaries are a particularly important force out here, in large measure because of the precarious legitimacy—and diplomatic standing—of many of these governments. In June this year, the fighting between the government of Pres. Gbagbo and the northern rebels resumed (HH), paused for a ceasefire (HH), then plunged forward just as the world recoiled from Bush's re-election (HH; and no, I am not insisting that there's a connection). In fact, Gbagbo did reveal to the world that there were, indeed, administrations more incompetent that the one presently governing a certain obscure North American republic: intending to punish the rebels in their capital of Bouake, his tiny air force killed nine French peacekeepers (CNN). Not only was this probably a monumentally unlucky case of "friendly fire," but he had violated a ceasefire. Pres. Chirac, within hours, ordered the destruction of his entire air force (two Su-25's and 5 helicopters), touching of massive anti-French riots—arguably another achievement of Pres. Gbagbo's campaign of xenophobia (BBC, Reuters, IRIN). The violence in the past by pro-Abidjan militia or gangs has been indiscriminate and vapid. In essence, this traditionally tolerant, hospital country is seething with xenophobia, and not just towards Europeans (ludicrously blamed for losing the country's civil war); violence has been directed against opposition groups in Abidjan and internally displaced Ivoirians, and I was wondering how a mere campaign for ivoirité caused this. Looking through the HRW report and reflecting on Mahmood Mamdani's When Victims Become Killers : Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, it's becoming clear to me how this came to pass. And I see it is definitely a topic for a future post. However, the short answer is as follows: The campaign to make Ivoirians nationalists, rather than Akanese or Mandé, was something that had flown in the face of the antecedent ethnic construction of the country: a polity of rival equals for patronage from a kleptocratic colonial power, and now, state. The new identity that Bédié had evidently sought to create was one of race, in which one group would be constructed as a stranger—the offspring of émigrés in the RCI—starting with Ouattara, the "disqualified" (because "Burkinese") presidential candidate. It has fallen to Gbagbo to do this using group violence, and gangs of vigilantes. |