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Ethiopian Protests

Ethiopian Protests-1

June 10, 2005

Ethiopia has been under the rule of nominal Marxists since Menghistu Haile Miriam seized power in a coup in November 1974 (LoC). However, the 2nd Derg (i.e., the one that accommodated the radical students and labor groups) was essentially Stalinist in character; it was driven by the logic of violence into both socialist proclamations, and a brutally nationalistic fundamentalism. Land reform, for example, was fueled by a need to liquidate the aristocratic landlords; the main initiative in industry was against unions, as a potential source of opposition to the Derg (LoC). The onset of famine in 1984 highlighted the grotesque failure of the Derg's "land reform" (LoC):

The primary government response to the drought and famine was the decision to uproot large numbers of peasants who lived in the affected areas in the north and to resettle them in the southern part of the country. In 1985 and 1986, about 600,000 people were moved, many forcibly, from their home villages and farms by the military and transported to various regions in the south. Many peasants fled rather than allow themselves to be resettled; many of those who were resettled sought later to return to their native regions. Several human rights organizations claimed that tens of thousands of peasants died as a result of forced resettlement.
Another government plan involved villagization, which was a response not only to the famine but also to the poor security situation. Beginning in 1985, peasants were forced to move their homesteads into planned villages, which were clustered around water, schools, medical services, and utility supply points to facilitate distribution of those services. Many peasants fled rather than acquiesce in relocation, which in general proved highly unpopular. Additionally, the government in most cases failed to provide the promised services. Far from benefiting agricultural productivity, the program caused a decline in food production. Although temporarily suspended in 1986, villagization was subsequently resumed.^1.1

While Menghistu's regime ostentatiously modelled itself on Castro's Cuba, the rhetoric had a bloodthirsty flavor (HRW), and the main figures seemed notably lacking in any sort of revolutionary narrative. Menghistu, in short, was not especially interested in any vision of a Socialist Ethiopia, so much as eliminating his enemies. His Derg tended to fight the war as a gigantic SMERSH battalion, forcing regular Ethiopians to the front (armed or not) and terrorizing their families if they deserted (HRW).

This naturally spawned a huge number of rejectionist guerrilla movements, from the well-known Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), to the Omo, Oromo, Tigray, and other like-named outfits. Probably because of the extreme centralization of political life in the country, all adopted virtually identical names, and by 1991 all were members of a larger front of fronts, the EPRDF. These succeeded in driving the gutted Derg from power in Ethiopia.

THE 1991 REVOLUTION

The first major change the People's Democratic Organizations (PDOs) made was to transform Ethiopia into a confederation of ethnically-defined republics, as opposed to arbitrary provinces (map). This is an immensely unpopular policy with Ethiopians abroad, who have complained about it to me quite a lot, actually. However, it is consistent with the traditional Marxist nationalities policy. Another major change was, of course, the arrest or exile of most of the old leadership. A third, finally, was the end of Soviet patronage.

The main instigator of the successful insurgency (as opposed to many failed ones) was the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF); Tigray is a region between the capital Addis Ababa and Eritrea, with its own language and historical traditions. The TPLF was, like the other insurgencies (and the government itself) Marxist, but it had at one time belonged to the Albanian tendency of Enver Hoxha.^1.2 Soon after Meles Zenawi became the chief of the TPLF, the Stalinist baggage was dumped in favor of an accommodationist, market-liberalization agenda.

The heady Marxist rhetoric of the People's Democratic Organizations (PDO's) was in some respects impossible to apply to a country where the only functioning enterprises were the private ones. Moreover, the coalitional nature of the revolutionary fronts did not permit a one-party state, certainly not right away. In 1993, after about two years of armistice, Addis Ababa recognized the independence of Eritrea. The elections of 1994 were boycotted by non-EPRDF parties; if I recall correctly, they were angry about the redrawing of the nations's provinces from ancient kingdoms (like Gojjam and Gondar) into ethnic regions like Oromo and Omo, or Afars. This looked to the established political organizations like a scheme to dissolve the country entirely, and the web is crammed with sites accusing him of being a traitor, an stooge of Communists, a stooge of Islamicists, and of course, a stooge of Washington.

These complaints are not entirely unprovoked. While ~~President~~ Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was probably trying to ensure Ethiopian independence by ending regional conflicts, his government remained the biggest jailer in Africa (Africa Confidential). The war had left huge swathes of territory depopulated, and as families returned to claim their land, disputes tended to exploit the long-simmering national rivalry. Patriotic resentment led to the sackings of large numbers of Ethiopians in Eritrea, and vice versa. By 1997, the ruling council of the EPRDF was blasting Zenawi for failing to take action against the uppity former province; in order to remain in office, he was essentially instructed to "get tough on Eritrea."

Zenawi pursued a policy of reconciliation with Eritrea; this was not surprising, since Tigreans and Eritreans were allies for years before the fall of the Derg, and Pres. Issayas Aferworki of Eritrea was a comrade of Zenawi. However, by May 1998, the two countries were at war. It was, in fact, the most massive war since the end of the 1995 Bosnian War when expressed in military capacity and expenditures (BBC). It involved a tiny, sparsely-populated region (BBC), and clearly erupted in order to resolve deep-seated political issues within the Ethiopian body politic. It cost about 80,000 lives and naturally trashed the principled independence of both countries. Moreover, the phase of freedom and pluralism was greatly curtailed (HRW).

Since then, the EPRDF position seemed weakened. Partly this was because the leadership had prevailed against the executive, Pres. Zenawi; partly it was because the regime had failed to avoid a gigantic war with its fraternal party; but it was also do to the fact that miniature insurgencies were smoldering in the rest of the country. Eritrea, Tigray, and Amhara (three northeastern provinces with related languages and histories) actually account for a minority of the population of Ethiopia/Eritrea (32%; compared to 40% Oromo; CIA), and the fact was that the political/national implications of the new division were sparking irredentist quarrels with neighbors (HRW, Africa Confidential).

(Part 2)

SOURCES: As always, the Library of Congress has a good counry study for Ethiopia; HRW also has excellent resources (and please don't overlook the links to the annual "Overview of Human Rights" for the country, lower righthand corner). I confess being a bit cautious about these sources, since the BBC, the LoC, and HRW are traditionally very mutually sympathetic (e.g., all three tend to be impatient with populist leaders like Hugo Chavez; the LoC has an editorial cutoff of 1989). I was also obligated to hunt down scholarly monographs such as “Administrative Allocation, Lease Markets and Inequality in Land in Rural Ethiopia: 1995-97” (PDF), by Bereket Kebede; and some articles like "The Woyane World: Living in the Reciprocal World," Embaie Ferrow, Dec '03. Another important source was Africa Confidential.

Romanization: the languages of Ethiopia, specifically Amharic and Tigrinya (Eritrea) use a distinct writing system derived ultimately from South Arabian. Hence, there is occasional disagreement on the appropriate way ton render names like Menghistu (or Mengistu). My system is totally arbitrary. Sorry.

NOTE: 1 This version of events is sustained by Jason Clay (Cultural Survival, 1988). Those interested in Ethiopian villagization may find additional (harsh) indictments of the program in Cultural Survival (1991), the LoC Country Study article on the topic, and this monograph (PDF, p.7ff) by Bereket Kebede.

2 The profusion of Marxist tendencies is a common problem of all extreme ideologies. Typically, Communist Parties in the West or the 3rd World were typically referred to as "Stalinist" if they were pro-Soviet; this, despite the fact that the post-1956 Soviet government had denounced the atrocities of Stalin and largely repudiated his methods. The Soviet Union was repressive and dysfunctional, but after '56, it was not Stalinist.

The alternative to "Stalinist" was typically "Trotskyite," referring to the "left-oppositionism" of exiled Politburo member Leon Trotsky (m. 1940). Trotskyites were often secretly patronized by the security services of many countries, including the USA, because they were bitter opponents of the Stalinists. After the 1970's, many former Trotskyites turned up as "neo-conservatives" or sympathizers (most famously, Christopher Hitchens). Another faction, however, was the Maoist Tendency (caveat: hostile appellation!). This faction was distinguished by eliminationist rhetoric towards the United States and a rejection of urban development entirely. Whereas Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy sought to accelerate the industrial revolution, and urbanize all aspects of production, the Maoists sought to liquidate the cities and diffuse production (Great Leap Forward, Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution-PDF). As everyone knows, this was taken to the greatest possible extreme under the regime of Pol Pot. Maoists, of course, insist that non-Maoists are revisionists.

Enver Hoxha was an Albanian who adopted Stalinist ideology while at the Sorbonne; he led a partisan group during the Italian occupation of Albania, then, in 1945, won control of the country. Between 1945 and 1960, Albania was a faithful ally of the USSR; after 1956, however, he began to express misgivings about the denunciation of Stalin. In 1960, he began to rely on Chinese aid instead of Soviet aid, and severed ties with the Warsaw Pact; Soviet advisors leave. Under Maoist tutelage, Hoxha undertook hardline Maoist poplicies and defended Beijing policies at the UN (the PRC did not, at that time, have a seat in either the General Assembly or the Security Council). His police, the Sigurimi, are the most repressive on earth, and by some accounts arrest a third of the entire population of Albania at one time or another. Religious persecution is total; all places of worship are confiscated and either demolished or converted to industrial uses. Persons caught with bibles or Qur'ans are sent to forced labor camps.

After 1976, Hoxha predictibly denounces the Chinese retreat from doctrinaire Maoism. The Chinese respond by suspending aid to Albania. Hoxha's regime, entirely isolated, adopts a policy of "self-reliance." It is ideologically distinct from Kim Il-Sung's Juche ("Self-Reliance") in that the latter interpreted self-reliance as depending on NGO's and hostages for aid. Hoxha dies in April 1985, having made Albania the most isolated country on earth. Five years later, what is left of Albania's economy collapsed, the Communist regime along with it; the largest exodus of refugees in postwar European history ensues.

Ethiopian Protests-2

June 10, 2005

Part One

The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia concealed the deep fissures in the Ethiopian leadership. It concealed the antagonism between the EPRDF's natural constitunency, cosmopolitan Ethiopian entrepreneurs, and the nationality-liberation policy of the EPRDF (the transformation of the old provinces into ethnic republics, led by regional nationalists). It concealed the clash between the EPRDR and the non-Amharic peoples, like the Oromo (who comprise 40% of the country's population) or the Sidamo (9%). The nationalities policy renounced the Amharic imperialism of the 19th century by creating a miniature fraternal commonwealth of autonomous states, much as the early Russian Soviet Federation (RSFSR) sought to do.

The new federal republic, however, could then accuse opposition parties of acting as separatist movements. In the early 1990's, HRW reports on Ethiopia were grateful for the massive improvement in human rights since the ouster of Menghistu Haile Miriam, and nearly always prefaced their reports with the disclaimer that the situation was of course far better than it had been before 1991. The Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), however, would have had to be most perverse to match the Derg for barbarism; the Derg was essentially a terrorist organization posing as a national government, a SMERSH battalion which addressed all problems by ordering people nearby to fix it—or else. For the roughly two thirds of Ethiopians who were not Tigrayans or Amharics, the situation was scarcely improved.

HRW, May '05 (PDF): Oromia is governed by the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), which was formed by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in 1990 and integrated into the TPLF-controlled Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition that seized power in and continues to hold power today. The OPDO has dominated politics in Oromia since 1992, when the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which had much older and deeper roots in Oromia, withdrew from the transitional political process after clashes with the EPRDF and the OPDO in the run-up to the country’s first national elections in 1992. Since then, OLF has waged a generally ineffectual “armed struggle” against the government—and the OPDO, the TPLF’s regional surrogate, has governed Oromia as if it were facing a serious military threat.

One of the things that often comes as a shock to radicals is the discovery that a change in regime doesn't translate to the end of the regime's abuses. Warlords from the 18th century developed the gult system of fiefdoms over peasants; this system has evidently survived to the present day:

Expanding upon a pre-existing system of local government that was designed by the Derg primarily as a tool to maintain tight political control, regional authorities have created an entirely new set of quasi-governmental institutions that now monitor and control the activities, speech and movement of the rural population down to the level of individual households. Regional authorities claim that these new institutions, called gott and garee, are voluntary associations of like-minded farmers who have joined together to carry out development work in their communities. But farmers throughout Oromia told Human Rights Watch that woreda (district) authorities imposed these new structures on their communities and that the garee regularly require them to perform forced labor on projects they have no hand in designing. More disturbingly, regional authorities are using the gott and garee to monitor the speech and personal lives of the rural population, to restrict and control the movement of residents, and to enforce farmers’ attendance at “meetings” that are thinly disguised OPDO political rallies.

Oromo was annexed to Ethiopia in the late 17th century, as the source of military auxilliaries to Iyasus (Jesus) I and Iyoas I; the political disposition of Oromo was for the most part not terribly urgent because of the virtually aboriginal character of the people. Under Emperor Menelik II, the administration of the gult system was tranformed to make the extraction of rents and military service more efficient. This system was unmatched in Africa, and led to Ethiopia's resistance to colonial rule. However, it has led to the conviction among the peoples of the Northeast that any head of state needs to be tough on the Oromo in oder to be an Ethiopian patriot.

In addition, the ideological preference of the TPLF (the entity that actually runs Ethiopia, under the guise of the EPRDF) for leftist traditions means that, despite the liberalized market economy prevailing in the larger cities of Ethiopia, political associations at the village level continue to dispense revolutionary justice. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) remains a military enemy, but also the only significant channel of political opposition in the huge swathe of the Southwest of the country (about a third of Ethiopians live in Oromiya).

HRW: Despite its defeat on the ground and long absence from the political scene, the OLF has retained its status as the most potent symbol of Oromo nationalism and continues in many ways to be the central focus of political discourse in Oromia. Since 1992, the OLF has waged what it calls an “armed struggle” against the EPRDF government; and in recent years, it has accepted military training and assistance from Eritrea. The OLF has occasionally managed to infiltrate fighters into Ethiopia and it has been blamed by EPRDF officials for a number of terrorist attacks throughout the country. But the OLF’s military adventures proved largely ineffectual, and few—if any—observers regard it as a serious military threat to the Ethiopian government. Nevertheless, the OPDO has used the specter of an ongoing OLF “armed struggle” to justify the widespread repression that is described in this report. Regional government and security officials routinely accuse dissidents, critics and students of being OLF “terrorists” or insurgents. Thousands of Oromo from all walks of life have been targeted for arbitrary detention, torture and other abuses even when there has been no evidence linking them to the OLF. Even some apolitical civil society organizations have been treated as subversive threats to the regime, hampering their ability to operate effectively.
Thus, the OLF and the OPDO are engaged in a tragic charade: The OLF pretends to be waging the kind of armed struggle that Meles Zenawi and the TPLF fought to bring down the Derg. The OPDO and the TPLF/EPRDF use the OLF’s quixotic guerrilla campaign to justify political repression. And the people of Oromia suffer from both sides’ pretentions.

This sort of repression was replicated on a much smaller scale in other parts of the country, and the overall HRW report on repression (here) is, like this post, mostly about repression against the OLF.

In the present tense, this translates to violent protests against the outcome of the recent parliamentary elections. After a shockingly poor showing in the elections ("only" 303 of 547 seats in parliament; scores are disputed; IRIN, BBC), protests erupted in the capital and many students were killed by the security forces (IRIN). Jonathan Edelstein (Head Heeb) has posted about the demonstrations and what they mean for Ethiopia. He looks at the behavior of the riot police, who fired life ammunition at students throwing rocks, and draws the conclusion that the riot police panicked (as opposed to the government, who merely employ the riot police). My conjecture is that the conduct of the police in the aftermath reflects a level of severe anxiety on the part of the Zenawi cabinet, which has been embattled for several years (especially considering Ethiopia is effectively a one-party state). The police have intensified harassment of journalists and detained hundreds more students, mimicking in some respects the crackdowns that followed the 4 June '89 Tiananmen Square crackdowns in Beijing.