The implications of evolutionary psychology are relatively sweeping: in contrast to classical psychology, EP posits that the mind/brain is like a computer:

"Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer" Cosmides & Tooby: The brain is a physical system whose operation is governed solely by the laws of chemistry and physics. What does this mean? It means that all of your thoughts and hopes and dreams and feelings are produced by chemical reactions going on in your head [...] The brain's function is to process information. In other words, it is a computer that is made of organic (carbon-based) compounds rather than silicon chips. The brain is comprised of [sic.] cells: primarily neurons and their supporting structures. Neurons are cells that are specialized for the transmission of information. Electrochemical reactions cause neurons to fire.

The rest of the primer is open to the same sort of criticism: the writers tried to simplify by drawing analogies that tend to undermine their arguments. For example, principle 2-"Our neural circuits were designed by natural selection to solve problems that our ancestors faced during our species' evolutionary history"-is used to explain evolutionary detritus, such as rape in an civilized society. Principle 3-"...Most of what goes on in your mind is hidden from you"-uses the allegory of a president's relationship to the federal government. The imputation is that consciousness sits atop a pyramid of communication, from sensory input (or spies, satellites, diplomats, experts) to the executive. The problem with this analogy is that a real government illustrates the paradox of plasticity and specialization: some departments, like the Pentagon, are called up to do everything that any government has ever undertaken to do. Others, such as the NSA and the Library of Congress, are hyperspecialized. Still others, like the Department of the Interior (or the Central Bank of Argentina), periodically change function entirely. Once a change of regime has occurred, the agency is entirely fixed.

Another summary of C&T's version of EP is furnished by David Buller:

"A Guided Tour of Evolutionary Psychology":...Adoption of an evolutionary perspective on human psychology immediately entails a number of very specific theoretical and methodological commitments. [...] The basic tenet of Evolutionary Psychology is that, just as evolution by natural selection has created morphological adaptations that are universal among humans, so it has created universal psychological adaptations. (An adaptation is a trait that has been fashioned by selection for its functional role in an organism). [...] The goal of Evolutionary Psychology, then, is to discover and describe the functioning of our psychological adaptations, which are the "proximate mechanisms" that cause our behavior (Cosmides & Tooby 1987).

Since the construction of complex adaptations is a very slow process of cumulative selection, typically requiring hundreds of thousands of years, Evolutionary Psychologists argue that our psychological adaptations cannot possibly be designed for modern life. Instead, they must be designed to solve the adaptive problems faced by our hunter-gatherer ancestors in the Pleistocene, the epoch spanning 1.8 million to 10,000 years ago [...] In other words, "the evolved structure of the human mind is adapted to the way of life of Pleistocene hunter-gatherers" [...]

As we have seen, Evolutionary Psychologists claim that the human mind contains "hundreds or thousands" of functionally specialized modules whose "basic logic is specified by our genetic program" [...] Over the course of human evolutionary history, according to Evolutionary Psychologists, modules "were cumulatively added because they 'reasoned' or 'processed information' in a way that enhanced the adaptive regulation of behavior"

[...]

This picture of the mind runs afoul of current knowledge of brain development [...] First, [...] if we possessed gene complexes that "specified" the designs of so many modules, there should be a positive correlation between brain complexity and genome size in the comparative record. But [...] despite our vastly more complex brains, humans have the same number of genes (roughly 80,000) as the house mouse, Mus musculus. Moreover, it appears that most of the genetic "specification" for our brain concerns the more peripheral structures, rather than the cortical structures that implement our higher cognitive functions. As much as 50% of our genes may be concerned with building our brain, yet fully 4% of these (roughly 1,600) are concerned with building the sensory cells located inside our nose. Our genes do not seem to worry much about how to create most of our brain and are instead dedicated to making sure our sensory transducers are constructed properly.

Second, the brain structures that perform specialized functions develop through a process of diffuse proliferation of brain cells and connections followed by a "pruning" that shapes this diffuse connectivity into relatively specialized structures [...] That is, brain structures are the product of a process consisting of both "additive" events (the formation and migration of brain cells and the formation of neural connections) and "subtractive" events (the pruning of synapses through cell death and axonal retraction) [...] The subtractive events, however, are not under genetic control. Rather, the subtractive events occur through cell competition, whereby cells with the strongest patterns of innervation (primarily from sensory inputs) retain their connections and the others die. Thus, genes code for the proteins involved in the additive events during brain development, but the forms and functions of brain structures are then determined by brain cell/environment interaction.

We may, nonetheless, have been faced with recurrent adaptive problems throughout our evolutionary history, and our brains may have indeed recurrently produced information-processing solutions to these problems. But contrary to Evolutionary Psychologists' a priori argument, distinct "genetically specified" modules were not required to solve these recurrent adaptive problems. Our brains hit upon a different solution: general plasticity that allows particular environmental demands to participate heavily in tailoring the responses to those very demands. This process can produce relatively stable brain structures that specialize primarily in particular information-processing tasks (that is, something like modules can emerge from this process), and these structures can be produced with some regularity across populations and down lineages. But, the extent to which modularized outcomes of human brain development have been regular throughout some of our evolutionary history is due to the fact that developmentally plastic human brains have encountered recurrent environmental demands throughout that history, not to "genetic specification" of the outcomes.

Having read several EP monographs, I confess Buller's conclusions come as something of a relief to me. EP conclusions seem rather trivial, violate my own understanding of certain social sciences, use logical fallacies to arrive at spurious conclusions, and avoid falsification. For example, in "Heroine with a Thousand Faces," the expectations (PDF-p.4) are a festival of crude sexist assumptions which the authors gamely suggest reflect appropriate reproduction strategies. They locate about 150 folk narratives from around the world, get student volunteers to key them in, and voila! They confirm their expectations of universality, then claim (p.5):

While some of these observations may seem obvious on the basis of commonsense, they are at odds with the dominant humanities models, which predict strong inter-cultural variability given the basically arbitrary nature of human social and gender relationships.