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Private Sector Imperialism-1January 31, 2005
[ Contents | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 |12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 ]
All imperialism is not the same. Some is motivated by commercial gain, but achieved with state collusion. The most famous example is probably the British East India Company, a joint-stock company that received a royal patent to trade with India, and (after 1670), the right to mint money, command fortresses, command armies, and generally assume the propinquity of a nation state. The Netherlands and France also had such companies (although the French version was essential a failed parastatal). These firms ultimately had bases in Indonesia, Malaysia, China, the Caribbean, and sundry islands in the Indian Ocean-as well as India. Their rivalry was sometimes violent: in 1623, Dutch forces overcame a British factory on Ambon Island, and tortured nineteen of the staff to death. This came shortly after the British EIC had violated a non-aggression pact with the Dutch VOC by capturing Batavia (present-day Jakarta).
In 1885, Belgian King Leopold II was awarded the Congo Free State as a private kingdom; it was entirely his private estate until 1908. During that time, Leopold waged a ferocious campaign to win control of the Congo Basin from local rulers, and then established a vast hierarchy of state-directed terrorism to extort rubber from the natives. The slaughter in the "Congo Free State" is estimated to have reduced the population from 20-30 million in 1885 to 8 million in 1904. If this is true, the "Rubber Terror" may have killed more people than the Holocaust in Europe. Once again, the technology of capital markets and modern firearms made imperialism such an effective way of capturing rents that private ventures lead the way, sometimes dragging the state along as a figleaf-and sometimes not. In the Cape Colony, private mining interests found the state indispensable in establishing a cheap supply of labor: [...]
Because blacks would not put up with such conditions if they could maintain an autonomous existence on their own lands, the British embarked on a large-scale program of conquest in the 1870s and the 1880s. Mine owners argued that if they did not get cheap labor their industries would become unprofitable. White farmers, English- and Dutch-speaking alike, interested in expanding their own production for new urban markets, could not compete with the wages paid at the mines and demanded that blacks be forced to work for them. They argued that if blacks had to pay taxes in cash and that if most of their lands were confiscated, then they would have to seek work on the terms that white employers chose to offer. As a result of such pressures, the British fought wars against the Zulu, the Griqua, the Tswana, the Xhosa, the Pedi, and the Sotho, conquering all but the last. By the middle of the 1880s, the majority of the black African population of South Africa that had still been independent in 1870 had been defeated, the bulk of their lands had been confiscated and given to white settlers, and taxes had been imposed on the people, who were now forced to live on rural "locations." In order to acquire food to survive and to earn cash to pay taxes, blacks now had to migrate to work on the farms, in the mines, and in the towns of newly industrialized South Africa. There was a time when your humble correspondent, mindful of this story, would have insisted the problem was ultimately statist. It wasn't after all, that miners and farmers were unregulated; it was that they could rely on an interventionist state. Leopold II used Belgian state resources to lobby for the creation of the Congo Free State, and, once he got it, raised capital with the implicit promise of Belgian support of his ventures. The monopoly power of the British East India Company was granted by state fiat. This, of course, is disingenuous.
The point of the private sector is that it is supposed to have an adversarial relationship to the public sector. That's not the same of open hostility: a professor has an adversarial relationship with students-that's why students have a motive to cheat on their exams. A judge who doesn't have an adversarial relationship towards the prosecution or the defense is not dispensing justice. "Pro-business" officials are lying about their motives; they're not "pro-business," they're anti-consumer and anti-labor. A pro-business official, in truth, is relentlessly neutral among the competing livelihoods and interests of society; that way, property rights are respected and the market is a neutral arbiter of objective merit. A "pro-business" regime, of course, disregards the interests or livelihoods of people who aren't "business," such as through "tort reform" denying accountability of firms to the public (a public that includes, of course, other businesses), loosening of regulations to prevent fraud or negligence, and sales of public goods to private parties.
The rhetoric employed by the lobbyists for the British EIC or Leopold's private foundations relied on the same appeals to "pro-business," or "pro-market" sentiment. The Conference of Berlin awarded the Free State to Leopold because he promised it would be open to all comers-a colossal free-trade zone, as far as Europeans and North Americans were concerned. "Pro-market" rhetoric is not problematic when it praises the ability of the market to supply information, but very much so when it demands that all private-sector enterprise be freed from accountability. That granted, the next order of business is taking over the state's prerogative to wage war and negotiate peace.
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