Those links are well worth visiting, but I'm more interested in this paper CNulan recommended (link at top of post).

The public health of the United States has long been compromised by inequality in the burden of personal violence. African Americans are six times more likely to be murdered than whites, a crime that is overwhelmingly intra-racial in nature. Homicide also is the leading cause of death among young African Americans, and both police records and self-reported surveys show disproportionate involvement in serious violence among blacks. Surprisingly, however, Latinos experience lower rates of violence overall than blacks despite being generally poorer, and Latino rates have been converging with those of whites in recent years.

These disparities remain a puzzle because scant empirical evidence bears directly on the explanation of differences in personal violence by race and ethnicity. Aggregate studies based on police statistics show that rates of violent crime are highest in disadvantaged communities that contain large concentrations of minority groups, but disparities in official crime may reflect biases in the way that criminal justice institutions treat different racial and ethnic groups rather than differences in actual offending. More important, aggregate and even multi-level studies typically do not account for correlated family or individual constitutional differences that might explain racial and ethnic disparities in violence.
[p. 3; as always, citation refers to PDF page number, not the editor's; emphasis added—JRM]

Before I proceed any further, I should get address one critical point: neither I nor the authors of the study are proponents of any notion of "inherent" racial differences. "Race" is a political status, conferred by history; a basic element is the legend of the race's putatively peculiar origins. Outside of the USA, racial distinctions would naturally follow a different breakdown.

Our theoretical framework does not view “race” or “ethnicity” as holding distinct scientific credibility as causes of violence. Rather, we argue they are markers for a constellation of external and malleable social contexts that are differentially allocated by racial and ethnic status in American society. We hypothesize that segregation by these social contexts in turn differentially exposes members of racial and ethnic minority groups to key violence-inducing or violence-protecting conditions.

There are three common explanations advanced for racially distinct experiences with violence:

1. …The higher rate of violence among African Americans is often attributed to a matriarchal pattern of family structure; specifically, the prevalence of single-parent, female-headed families in the African-American community. Some have augmented this view by arguing that female-headed families are a response to structural conditions of poverty, especially the reduced pool of employed black men that could adequately support a family.
2. …Socioeconomic inequality […] is the root cause of violence. Black female-headed families are spuriously linked to violence, by this logic, because of their lack of financial resources relative to two-parent families.
3. …Racial and ethnic minority groups in the United States are differentially exposed to salient neighborhood conditions, such as the geographic concentration of poverty and reduced informal community controls, which cannot be explained by personal or family circumstances. Prior research indicates that African Americans and, to a lesser extent, Latinos, are highly segregated residentially. Although never tested directly, the implication is that neighborhood segregation may explain individual race-ethnic gaps in violence.

Notice that here and elsewhere, the extreme differences in violence as experienced by Whites and Blacks in America is profound. So the research model whittles this down swiftly:

Model 1 estimates racial/ethnic disparities in violence controlling only for age and sex, providing a baseline of comparison to subsequent models that add other explanatory variables. Exponentiating the log-odds coefficient, we see that African Americans’ odds of engaging in violence are ...1.85 those of whites,...
[p.12]

Model 2 in Table 1 adds controls for immigrant generation, revealing that the level of violence is comparatively lower for recent immigrants. First-generation immigrants’ odds of violence are almost half those of third-generation immigrants, [i.e.,...] 0.48, 0.58.... and second generation immigrants’ odds are approximately 3/4 those of third-generation immigrants...Controlling for immigrant generation reduces the logistic regression coefficient that describes the gap between African Americans and whites by 14%, implying that one reason whites have lower levels of violence than African Americans is that whites are more likely to be recent immigrants.
[p.13]

Model 3 introduces controls for family structure, SES, and length of residence. Adding these controls reduces the logistic regression coefficient that describes the gap between African Americans and whites by an additional 24%. The odds ratio describing that gap is now reduced from 1.70 to 1.49... Adding these controls also reduces the contrast between Mexican Americans and whites to non-significance... For participants with married parents, the odds of violent offending are 0.81 times those with unmarried parents... Thus, among all of the dimensions of family structure, marital status alone is predictive of violence.
[p.14]

Model 4 assesses the explanatory power of constitutional differences between individuals, as operationalized by verbal/reading IQ and impulsivity/hyperactivity... High impulsivity increases the risk of violence but there are no significant interactions by race/ethnicity.
[p.14]
[p.14]

Model 5 introduces neighborhood race/ethnic composition measured from the cohort sample, allowing us to disentangle the person-level (i.e., within-neighborhood) and compositional (i.e., between-neighborhood) components of the association between race/ethnicity and violence.40 The logistic regression coefficient describing the gap in violence between African Americans and whites is reduced by an additional 33%. The odds ratio describing the gap decreases from 1.45 to 1.28
[p.15]

Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that African Americans are segregated by neighborhoods and thus differentially exposed to key risk and protective factors, an essential ingredient to understanding the black-white disparity in violence. The race-related neighborhood features predicting violence are percent professional/managerial workers, moral/legal cynicism, and the concentration of immigration. We found no systematic evidence that neighborhood- or individual-level predictors of violence interacted with race/ethnicity. The relationships we observed thus appeared to be generally robust across racial/ethnic groups. We also found no significant racial or ethnic disparities in trajectories of change in violence. Similar to the arguments made by William Julius Wilson in The Truly Disadvantaged, these results imply that generic interventions to improve neighborhood conditions may reduce the racial gap in violence. Policies such as housing vouchers to aid the poor in securing residence in middle class neighborhoods, may achieve the most effective results in bringing down the longstanding racial disparities in violence. Policies to increase home ownership and hence stability of residence may also reduce disparities (see model 3, Table 2).

Family social conditions matter as well. Our data show that marriage of parents, but not family configuration per se, is a salient factor predicting both the lower probability of violence and a significant reduction in the black-white gap in violence. The tendency in past debates on black families has been either to pathologize female-headed households as a singular risk factor or to emphasize the presence of extended kin as a protective factor. Yet neither factor predicts violence in our data. Rather, being reared in married-parent households is the distinguishing factor for children, supporting recent work on the social influence of marriage and calls for renewed attention to the labor-market contexts that support stable marriages among the poor.

Although it was smaller to begin with, our analysis explained the entire gap in violence between whites and Latino ethnic groups. The lower rate of violence among Mexican Americans as compared to whites was explained by a combination of married parents, living in a neighborhood with a high concentration of immigrants, and individual immigrant status. The contextual effect of concentrated immigration was robust, holding up even after taking into account a host of factors including the immigrant status of the person.