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Saudi Arabia-5: al-Dar as-Sa'ud 3.0

August 4, 2005


[ Intro; Part 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 ]


Click on image for data

DATES: 1975-present; the recent influences of the Saudi House on the rest of the world

Readers may be excused for thinking this final chapter is redundant: in part 3, I discussed the importance of Saudi oil, and in part 4 I discussed the Saud's use of oil wealth to influence regions that do not buy substantial amounts of oil (e.g., Afghanistan). What other forms of power and influence could the Saudis have, besides ready cash and abundant streams of cheaply-recovered oil? In this article, I will attempt to explain this.

ABDUL SAMID GOES TO WASHINGTON

In Variations on Day and Night, novelist Abdelrahman Munif writes about the rise to power of Sultan Khureybit (modelled on Abdul Aziz ["ibn Saud"]). This novel is different from the previous parts of the trilogy: whereas the other two are biting satire, Variations is lyrical and wistful, as if the Sultanate of Mooran might have turned out so differently. We are introduced to Hamilton (modelled on Jack Philby). In Variations, the ebb and flow of his relationship with the House of Khureybit is central. He successfully wins for Khureybit the support of the British Foreign Office, then eventually breaks with his employers because of his close loyalties to Khureybit.

Hamilton is a sympathetic character in large measure because he is so intelligent and decent. His complex, but ultimately virtuous, motivations tend to make him stick out among Munif's other characters, who are for the most part disappointing either in their venality or their inability to see beyond a very narrow scope. He retains high hopes for the Sultanate of Mooran, but is disappointed and apprehensive about the corrupting influence of oil wealth on the society. Towards the very end, he converts to Islam and takes the name Abdul Samid.

We can imagine very easily a clever Englishman with a deep spiritual yearning, who finds the Bedouin lifestyle rewarding and meaningful, and makes himself useful to a local prince. He understands both Britain (whose assistance may be decisive for the prince) and the Bedouin, and because he was recruited and trained by a large modern country, he is an intellectual superman. The Bedouin are easily influenced by him because he is a superman among men, and because the Bedouin are by nature very, very, very fractious.

I am inviting the reader to imagine the shoe on the other foot.

Imagine, in other words, that Abdul Samid has come to the West, and finds a society so diffuse, so splintered in its loyalties that it makes the Arabia of 1700 look like Denmark today. There are many reasons why Europeans cannot do so—for one thing, as individuals they tend to lack the concentrated power over tranches of cash that the Saudi royals have. For another, the European tends to harbor a view of the US as so cosmically dreadful, so void of redeeming virtue, as to be somehow beyond influence (like something out of Thomasine theology). The idea that there is something precious in our society or culture that requires defending, is something no European would be likely to accept. Yet, failure to grasp this precludes any sort of guiding relationship between a character like Hamilton, and an American analog to Khureybit. I might add, with profound irony, that Europeans are too similar to us; they face a true danger of literally "going native," losing the trust and respect of their compatriots in the process.

The representatives of Northeast Asian governments, including China's, tend to be under very close control from their employers, and hence not at liberty to take initiatives like T.E. Lawrence's, John B> Glubb's, or Jack Philby's were. There is a general institutional bias in Northeast Asian foreign services and corporations to the effect that the West is immutable, although several managers from Japan have successfully propagated Japanese-developed efficiency methodologies at US subsidiaries of Japanese keiretsu. I could go into further detail, but each other major power has severe obstacles that prevent its citizens from being likely to cultivate close, friendly ties with the elites in this ones. Either the culture is too similar to permit of Hamilton's falling in love from afar, or its top caste is too professional and aloof, or the elites have no entree into the circles of American power.

Yet there is ample reason to suppose that our country will become more, not less, under the personal thumbs of future Khureybits. The illusion of US sovereignty will fade, and we are likely to find ourselves more painfully aware of the fact that foreigners pay the piper and call the tune. Yet, someone will be needed to finesse the relations between plutocrats desperate for financing, and foreign ministries of finance. The latter will need Hamiltons, and find them in the Persian Gulf region. In Plan of Attack, for example, Prince Bandar's personal influence on the President and his father entirely surpasses that of Secretary Colin Powell (CBS, excerpts).

(Part 6)


SOURCES & RECOMMENDED READING: Prof. Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, Harvard University Press, 1991;

Prof. Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, Cambridge University Press, 1988;

Abdelrahman Munif, Cities of Salt (1989); The Trench (Vintage, 1993); Variations on Day and Night (1994); dates refer to translations from the Arabic by Peter Theroux

Library of Congress Country Studies: Saudi Arabia

CIA World Factbook: Saudi Arabia

Middle East Institute Saudi Arabia; see esp. Thomas Lippman, "...And Saudi Votes That May Count" (Nov '03); "Untangling Complex American-Saudi Relations" (Jan '04);

Wikipedia Entry, Saudi Arabia; history of; insurgency in; Saudi Aramco; King Faisal; King Khalid; King Fahd; King Abdallah; [Crown Prince] Sultan; Excellent, critical articles on Sayyid Qutb at Paleo Ideofact: on his Social Justice in Islam, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16; on Milestones (link is to complete text online): 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6; 7; 8. The significance of Sayyid Qutb to Islam is confined to ideological debates now raging in the Islamic world; Qutb's views cannot be construed as related to Salafism ("Wahhabism"), the established religion of Saudi Arabia.