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Taiwan (and the Secessionist Risk)

  1. Part 1
  2. Part 2


Taiwan-1

July 31, 2004

The Taiwanese President, Chen Shui-bien, has proposed drafting a new constitution for the country. This would be put to a vote in 2006 and enacted in 2008. Taiwan has a constitution that was adopted in 1946; it's a rather cumbersome system with five branches of government (the civil service and anti-graft system are the two additional branches) that were intended to entrench the power of the dictatorial Kuomintong Party. The Asia Times has this article outlining the reasons why Chen would want to do such a thing; his re-election in April this year has given the impetus to go ahead with the change.

But there is a problem: the People's Republic of China (PRC) regards Taiwan as a renegade province. In 1996, the PRC went ballistic—literally—when the country held free elections and elected Chen Shui-bien from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), ending a 47-year monopoly on political power on the island. Since that, Chinese rhetoric about attacking Taiwan has escalated sharply. Today, the China Daily carries a blunt threat that any such referendum would provoke an invasion.

Taiwan has been a potential flashpoint since 1950, when the former KMT government of China relocated there. Some readers may remember the Quemoy & Matsu crisis (August '54-May '55), during which two tiny islands claimed by the former "Republic of China" ("Nationalist," or KMT China) were shelled by the Chinese PLA. During that crisis, there was serious debate about the possibility of using atomic bombs to defend Taiwan from the planned PLA invasion. The US government continued to insist on recognition of the old Nationalist government as the one legitimate government of China until 1978, when recognition was switched to the Communist government in Beijing. Since then, Taiwan has become a diplomatic anomaly, recognized by a tiny number of Latin American and Pacific islander nations as the legitimate government of China; the Vatican also maintains diplomatic recognition of the old Republic of China.

Taiwan remained a one-party autocracy until 1991; about the same time as multiparty elections arrived in Taiwan, the leadership in the Zhongnanhai1.1 was replaced by the troika Li Peng (Premier, 1987-1998), Jiang Zemin (President, 1993-2003; Gen. Secr., CCP, 1989-2002; Chairman of the Central Military Commission, 1989-present). After decades of managing to avoid offending the powerful, and close association with political conservatives in the CCP, Jiang allowed his icy demeanor to emerge. He tends to be thin-skinned and vain, and often expounds on his plan to invade Taiwan.

Since March 2003, the leaders have been phased out in favor of Hu Jintao (president, GS-CCP) and Wen Jiabao (PM). The post of Central Military Commission remains occupied by Jiang Zemin, leaving the 78-year old with the decisive grip on power. Jiang, who earlier had used missiles fired over Taiwan to influence the '96 elections there, practiced the invasion of the island this month (BBC). Most recently, PRC Pres. Hun Jintao demanded that the US suspend military contacts with Taiwan (BBC). This also comes amid a determined EU bid to enhance relations with Beijing (although the French state-owned arms industry is not averse to selling advanced weapons systems to Taiwan; see also here).

UPDATE: Interesting Straits Times (Singapore) article about Pres. Chen Shui-bian's attempt to set up the DPP as a counterweight to the KMT.

President Chen's political fortunes have certainly turned around. Soon after March 20,...accusations that he was a 'bogus' president who 'stole' the election were raining on him thick and fast [...] But once the storm passed, President Chen, who won by a mere 0.2-per-cent margin, bounced right back.

'The key to this change was [Chen] getting eventually the much-needed recognition from the United States over his disputed electoral win,' said political analyst Chang Ling-cheng [...]. The opposition [...] KMT [...] had hoped that America, Taiwan's principal backer, would withhold that. But it was not to be.

According to Taiwanese media, President Chen's prompt decision to honour a promise to buy NT$610 billion (US$17.9 billion—JRM) worth of arms from the US, even before he was inaugurated, and his pledge to cease the pre-election provocations of China that had been giving Washington heartburn, did the trick.

But the Presidential Office has consistently denied that Taiwan used the weapons deal to win US support.

This last allegation was startling, so I did a search of the Taipei Times archives. This netted a 25 June article on the difficulties of establishing what the USG would allow the Taiwanese ministry of defense to buy:
Taipei Times: New differences between Taiwan and the US over the question of Taiwan acquisition of diesel-powered submarines came into sharp focus this week during talks between delegation members and American officials, delegation members revealed in Washington on Wednesday. [...] Nearly two dozen other lawmakers and government defense and foreign officials spent three days in high-level talks with US officials on arms purchases, mainly those covered by the US$18 billion special budget the Cabinet has approved. [...]In a process outlined by the Americans, which is alien to Taiwan's usual practices, the US said that Taiwan should give performance specifications to all potential companies bidding for the contract to build the subs and conduct competitive bidding to see who could build the best and cheapest vessels.

That would leave the cost of the eight vessels the government seeks to purchase — estimated by Taiwanese experts at about US$12 billion — up in the air. How Taipei would arrange payment is also a matter of dispute. The legislators want Washington to provide detailed quotes for the price of the equipment and then use those figures to pass a special arms procurement budget. On the other hand, the US wants Taiwan to pass the budget first, and then go out to bid for individual items.

The USA has an all-nuclear fleet of submarines, which it may not sell except to some very special allies; according to some observers, the most likely method is to buy submarines from a third party and re-sell them to Taiwan after outfitting them with American electronics. The preferred vendor? Russia.

(Part 2)


NOTE: 1.1 The Zhongnanhai is the administrative center of the PRC government in Beijing. It is located near Tiananmen Square, directly to the west of the Forbidden City (maps). The adjacent Forbidden City was begun in 1406 by the Ming Emperor Yong-le, and served as the religious and administrative center of the country to 1911.


Taiwan-2

July 31, 2004

(Part 1)

This is a fine mess. The Chinese government and its urban middle class are fiercely jingoistic about Taiwan. They reject any sort of negotiation with Taiwan for unification, instead demanding that the Taiwanese sign their life away with no guarantees. On the other hand, the Taiwanese government has been tugging harder towards full indepedence for the country, something that is certainly logical—but, given the attitudes of the nuclear-armed Mainland, implausible. The US government supported the island enclave from '49 to the present, in part to maintain an offshore base for pressure on Beijing; this introduces an invidious motive few Chinese nationalists can fail to resent. The EU and its antecedents (including member states) chide the USA for provoking Beijing, seek to curry favor with Beijing, but sell advanced weapons systems to Taipei. The USSR remained aloof from the conflict, but Russia has resumed weapons sales to the PRC; it remains cordial with Beijing, but indifferent to the status of Taiwan. There's a rumor that the USA is planning to buy eight Soviet-era Kilo-class submarines and refit them for use by Taiwan. China already has four submarines of Russian provenance.

Japan has a limited role; its main contribution is the pool of technology and intelligence it contributes to Taiwan's impressive weapons industry. The same is true for Singapore (Singapore is about 80% Chinese, recognizes Beijing as the government of all China, but trains its armed forces with Taiwan's; the Republic of Korea switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing in '92, ending most military cooperation as well). From 1895 to 1945, Taiwan was a possession of Japan, but it had a relatively benign period of rule from Tokyo, and there's relatively little resentment of Japan in Taiwan.

The ideal endgame for the Chinese-Taiwan confrontation would be a commonwealth association between the two, as exists between the USA and Puerto Rico. The Chinese, by all accounts, are very passionate about regaining Taiwan; its continued autonomy is, from the Chinese point of view, a hangover of colonialism. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the Chinese leadership is interested in any sort of guarantee to the Taiwanese of how they would be treated in the event of a merger. If the merger were peaceful, would the Taiwanese lose their incomes? Their ability to move and travel freely? In view of the fact that the Chinese government has extremely tight restrictions on the movement of its own citizens within China—for example, it's illegal to move from one prefecture to another without express written permission from one's employer and party official, and one requires permission from the block committee to get married—would the PRC consider waiving these restrictions on Taiwanese within Taiwan?

The PRC already harbors stupendous variances in wealth from prefecture to prefecture, to say nothing of provinces. Despite Communist rule, the PRC doesn't interfere in this, and the Hong Kong Special Autonomous Region is actually substantially wealthier than Taiwan. HK-SAR doesn't fear for its margin of affluence; it fears for the level of personal freedom and concomitant business opportunity it enjoys within its enclave. Often, freshly won freedoms are more stoutly defended than old ones.

If Jiang Zemin, Chairman of the PRC/CCP Central Military Commissions, is succeeded by someone with a different philisophy—perhaps someone who really believes the Taiwanese are fellow Chinese, rather than the incarnation of all the hurt and indignity China has suffered since the beginning of the Q'ing Dynasty. Such a leader easily win over the Taiwanese, and begin a formal relationship ending in complete union. That seems very far off; it's also true, however that Chairman Jiang has been challenging the Bush Administration with especial vehemence since the April 2001 P-3 Orion incident, and some commentators have argud that this really is primarily about the current administration.

This is understandable. First, the most urgent future need of China is a steady supply of petroleum. The most logical outcome is to set up a pipeline from the Tengiz Oilfields (n. Caspian Sea, w. Uzbekistan) and pump the stuff through Russia and Kazakhstan to China. While this is going to happen eventually, our Department of State has spent a staggering amount of effort trying to bypass Russian, Iranian, or Chinese territory in order to get petrol out of the Caspian Sea region. Look at a map. It's no picnic. Under the Clinton Administation, this was a rather private folly, with little support by official Washington. Under the Bush administration, it's been an obsession. It would be more inflamatory, but for the fact that oil prices have usually been low for the last four years, and the fields themselves have been a dud; their potential yield was evidently overstated in the early 1990's.

Second, the arms supply connection. I refer readers to this article at EastSouthWestNorth:

What are the known Chinese interests in this? Their stated position is that Taiwan is Chinese sovereign territory by history. Their current priorities are economic growth and stability. Any attempt to resolve this matter by military force is going to bring about international sanctions and boycotts, thus destroying everything that they have built up over the last 20 years. Therefore, they are quite happy to live with the unresolved ambiguity of the relationship between China and Taiwan. This matter may not be resolved in the lifetime of the current leaders, or the next set of leaders, but it won't bother them. They are happy to allow the people of Taiwan to elect whoever they choose, and they will probably accept a "One Country, Two Systems" model where Taiwan runs itself in the future. Simply put, Taiwan can have its democracy anyway it wishes.

However, they will never ever accept a declaration of independence wherein some Taiwan government declares itself to be a separate nation. In the United States, the Civil War occurred as a result of something similar. But so far nothing like that has happened until the Taiwan president Chen Shui-Bian floated the idea of a referendum that sounded like Taiwan independence. This precipitated a crisis in which China had to sound its battle trumpets.

What are the known interests in Taiwan about this? Poll after poll have shown that the support of Taiwan independence is less than 30%, chiefly among the lower socio-economic indigenous population which forms the core support of President Chen Shui-Bian's Democratic Progressive Party. The polls show that the majority of the people prefer to continue the status quo.

I'm doubtful about the contention that the Zhongnanhai would accept internal Taiwanese democracy provided there were no effort to secede. The individual US states can alter their constitution without "seceeding" from the USA; the Taiwanese government could merely reassure Beijing it is ending the KMT's statutory advantage in elections, but the "One China Policy" stands intact. Instead, the de facto leadership of China is declaring that war is coming, not merely warning that it might. But I think this post, same site, is spot on:
Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's new book Believe in Taiwan — President A-bian's Report to the People is summarized by Apple Daily (HK):
China does not have to take over Taiwan. All they needed is a pro-China government, which would turn Taiwan into a second Hong Kong. The Chinese navy fleet will then be based on the east coast of Taiwan and threaten the security of all of Southeast Asia. Therefore, this is not just a matter of the survival of Taiwan. China is advocating the application of Hong Kong's "One Country, Two Systems" approach to Taiwan. This is unrealistic wishful thinking: Hong Kong and Taiwan are completely different, like bananas and apples. The promise of 50 years of status quo seemed to guarantee that Beijing will not interfere with Hong Kong, but it is actually impeding reform in Hong Kong. In becoming a part of China, Hong Kong is like a deflated balloon. Hong Kong has lost its international stature and its brilliance. Taiwan is not a problem to China, it is the solution. The democratization of Taiwan is the beacon for Chinese political reform.
This is somewhat pathetic in the manner of the Glenn Close character in Fatal Attraction who insisted, "I will not be ignored!" China's overriding goal right now is economic growth and stability, and the Taiwan issue is not a priority at all. It may be resolved tomorrow or 10 years later or 50 years later. Meanwhile, the Chinese economy will just keep growing and growing. The people of Taiwan can run their country in whatever way that they see fit, and it wouldn't bother the Chinese —- with the exception of the magic word Independence, in which case all bets are off. China even cut off diplomatic relations with tiny Kiribati because the latter wanted to play the "Two Chinas" game. Meanwhile, President Chen needs to show that he is relevant in his bid to be re-elected. So he is just pushing the one issue that he knows will get attention.
I understand, because I have several friends from the region, that many people in Taiwan harbor a strong desire to establish the principle of independence from China; but the majority understand that that's not in in the cards.
Comments on this Post:

Perry Anderson has a good take on the recent elections and developments in Taiwan here:

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n11/ande01_.html

Posted by: Conrad Barwa at August 4, 2004 04:17 AM

Thanks very much for that link. The article was fascinating, but his stance on the American Civil War is predictably British. (All Britons root for the Confederates in retrospect. They can never agree why, but they always do.) If you want to understand the ACW, you need to read W.E.B .Dubois.

Posted by: James R MacLean at August 4, 2004 08:28 AM

The article was fascinating, but his stance on the American Civil War is predictably British. (All Britons root for the Confederates in retrospect. They can never agree why, but they always do.)

I missed his reference here to the ACW, perhaps you can point it out to me; he did make a reference to the American anti-colonial Revolution but that is obviously a different matter. I would be surprised if Anderson would root for the Confederacy in anycase, except perhaps at some cultural-emotional level, if that since he is bascially a Marxist theoretician but I could be wrong on this point.

Posted by: Conrad Barwa at August 4, 2004 08:04 PM

Where a nation-state was already constituted, rather than still to be created, self-determination has been systematically rejected. In such cases, the right typically reverses into a taboo. For ideologically speaking, what is then at stake is not 'self-determination', but 'secession'. This is the Lincolnian moment. Its historical record is virtually as uniform as its Wilsonian or Leninist opposites. The American Civil War with its 600,000 dead - the largest military-industrial massacre of the 19th century - was fought to suppress the separation, approved by unimpeachable democratic majorities, of the Confederacy from the Union.

When I noticed this, I realized Anderson was not a Californian (though that's where he works), but a Briton. The British believe the American Revolution was merely another secession—identical in character to, say, a zillion other separatist movements, except more morally squalid than any of them (Hence, the innocuously neutral-sounding "American War of Independence.") But it was a revolution, and it had a parallel movement within England. IOW, it wasn't anti-English; it was directed against royal prerogative.

Modern neo-confederates usually feel the need to scorn the wrongheadedness of the Union-as-emancipator narrative. The Union's official institutions did not consider emancipation until long after the war began; the emancipation was not accompanied by adequate land reform or some other provision to take care of the former slaves, so most fell back into labor-alienating sharecropper relationships.

The problem with this reasoning is that revolutions don't have their outcomes determined by "vanguards"; the first movers in a revolution don't start by announcing their final aims. The intransigence of the CSA drove the revolution of 1861-65 to it final conclusion, but Anderson's analysis is the old Times one of Lincoln as a moral monster, prepared to kill en masse in order to preserve a tawdry political fiat. The historic implications of the war are tossed out—the entire rationale for the American Revolution itself is disregarded, since that is thought of as nothing more than an opportunistic secession.

If you scratch a British Marxist, you usually find yourself with a hardline monarchist.

Posted by: James R MacLean at August 5, 2004 09:54 AM

The British believe the American Revolution was merely another secession—identical in character to, say, a zillion other separatist movements, except more morally squalid than any of them (Hence, the innocuously neutral-sounding "American War of Independence.") But it was a revolution, and it had a parallel movement within England. IOW, it wasn't anti-English; it was directed against royal prerogative.

I agree with you about this, particularly since it had the characteristics of a Civil war almost as much as one against the British. It is taught very much as just an anti-colonial revolt in British history - I speak as someone who has gone through and observed this schooling process. However, I think you mistake Anderson’s theoretical point about secession always being characterised as such after the constitution of a nation-state as opposed to self-determination of a constituent part for support for the Confederacy; I highly doubt that any Marxist whatever their hue would support a slave-owning plantocracy - as Marx’s own writings make clear, this is not a tenable position.

The problem with this reasoning is that revolutions don't have their outcomes determined by "vanguards"; the first movers in a revolution don't start by announcing their final aims. The intransigence of the CSA drove the revolution of 1861-65 to it final conclusion, but Anderson's analysis is the old Times one of Lincoln as a moral monster, prepared to kill en masse in order to preserve a tawdry political fiat. The historic implications of the war are tossed out—the entire rationale for the American Revolution itself is disregarded, since that is thought of as nothing more than an opportunistic secession.

Umm, I think his reasoning is correct; most historians would agree that emancipation was an outcome of the war not its direct cause. Lincoln isn’t a monster but like many his ideas about how to deal with the slaves revolved very much around repatriation to Africa or settlement outside the Union; given the state of race relations most anti-slavery people at the time wouldn’t have understood why many African ex-slaves would have wanted to remain in a country where so many of the White population hated or regarded them as inferior. Things did change but as a consequence of the nature of the war; reconstruction could have suceeded more if the North had shown the will to remain in the South and carried out the reforms by force but it was unwilling to maintain a military occupation and indulge in this kind of coercion so it ended. For a Marxist like Anderson, in a way though the Civil War was about ending slavery as he would have seen it as a competition between two forms of socio-economic organisation - a modern industrial one based on wage labour and a plantation-commercial one based on slavery. The two were incompatible and for capitalist growth to occur in the rest of the new and potential states within the Union the latter had to be displaced as a model of labour relations. Similar reasoning can be brought to bear about the American Revolution whose radicalism was quickly circumscribed by established property relations - as the work of Charles Beard and other historians of the period demonstrate.

If you scratch a British Marxist, you usually find yourself with a hardline monarchist.

I don’t think so; at the most perhaps an English Marxist, as most Celtic Marxists tend to have a dim view of the Monarchy - see Tom Nairn’s excellent work The Enchanted Glass on the subject but Nairn is a Scottish Marxist. Still most ‘English Marxists’ despised the monarchy you only have to look at the work of historians such as Christopher Hill on the radicalism of the English Revolution and Rodney Hilton of feudal class relations to see this. For them the monarchy stood for all the irrationality and injustices of the English class system; modern day English Marxists like Terry Eagleton and Hobsbawm are hardcore anti-monarchists.

Posted by: Conrad Barwa at August 5, 2004 05:15 PM

I think his reasoning is correct; most historians would agree that emancipation was an outcome of the war not its direct cause.

No one is challenging this. The ACW was launched by the slavocracy, not the federal government. Moreover, the federal government could not POSSIBLY have announced something as drastic as that, because it had—up to 1860—included southern members in Congress. So suddenly declaring, "I, Abraham Lincoln, am going to abolish slavery and enfranchise the African American population" was not merely imprudent—it was impossible for anyone elected to the POTUS.

ME: The problem with this reasoning is that revolutions don't have their outcomes determined by "vanguards"; the first movers in a revolution don't start by announcing their final aims.

Let me try to put this another way: if national self-determination were regarded as an absolute right in 1861, then republics would all disintegrate and the only countries that could survive would thereafter have been autocratic. The reason all republics would cease to exist, as opposed to that particular one, is that any system designed to arbitrate among rival interests would be unable to maintain survive dissent.

So while the Britons just see the two wars—the AWoI (1775-83) and the ACW (1861-65)—as two secessionary phases, one of which was suppressed by the victors in the first, this view is simply wrong. The first one was not at all anti-English, complicated as it was; it was a revolution. The people who carried it out were English, very often English workers. Our declaration of independence spells this out. The British reaction is, "Oh, well, of course they would say that, wouldn't they?"

The revolution of 1861 was a falangist one, and the first movers were the one-party states (what Anderson calls "impeccable democratic majorities"); in fact, for years a festering problem has been the fact that the slavocracy had power but no representation amongst the better part of its population: of 5 million whites and four million slaves on the eve of the ACW, only 2 million were in the class that could vote (so—about half a million voters for the entire 12-state population of 9 million). This is not an impeccable democratic majority.

Everytime a country or organization changes its policy on an important issue, however, it's not the vanguards with the maximalist position who are in charge. What you have is tug of war, with the midpoint of the rope inching along. The POTUS is never supposed to be an ideologue; he's supposed to be a facilitator and referee. Lincoln was the best one of these we've ever had.

I'm really sorry I can't address this suject properly right now, Conrad. I've already spent far too much time and it is OT. It merits another post. It must be admitted, though, that Lincoln is part of my personal pantheon—someone I revere beyond expression. WEB Dubois's book, while moderately critical of Lincoln (Lincoln struck him as too cautious; much as I admire Dubois, I have to differ. Dubois, as a historical icon, stands for extreme virtue; Lincoln, extreme wisdom), points out the real conditions of the war and its onset.

Yes, I have read Marx on the ACW and he's great.

The remark about "British Marxist = monarchist": I don't meant they all admire the Hanoverians!

Posted by: James R MacLean at August 5, 2004 07:07 PM

Let me try to put this another way: if national self-determination were regarded as an absolute right in 1861, then republics would all disintegrate and the only countries that could survive would thereafter have been autocratic. The reason all republics would cease to exist, as opposed to that particular one, is that any system designed to arbitrate among rival interests would be unable to maintain survive dissent.

I think this is a false argument, in that it assumes all political conflicts are essentially nationalist or identity based - they are not. It is correct in so far as each nation contains smaller constituent parts but the way the whole is imagined imparts a level of unity that won’t always fly apart at the first internal disagreement - see Bendedict Anderson’s ‘Imagined Communities’ if you haven’t already for a good illustration of this point.

So while the Britons just see the two wars—the AWoI (1775-83) and the ACW (1861-65)—as two secessionary phases, one of which was suppressed by the victors in the first, this view is simply wrong. The first one was not at all anti-English, complicated as it was; it was a revolution. The people who carried it out were English, very often English workers. Our declaration of independence spells this out. The British reaction is, "Oh, well, of course they would say that, wouldn't they?"

Well, two things here. Firstly neither at a popular level nor at a professional historical one; have I even come across anybody regard the ACW in the was you have described above; I also don’t think this is what Anderson believes, as he was just using a metaphor to prove a point. My knowledge of early US history is shaky but my understanding is that it was only in the first few decades that each state of the former 13 colonies came close to leaving the Union; by the mid-19th century the Federal mode of governance had grown to an extent that this was not possible. I recall vaguely about Rhode Island or Mass. Wanting to leave the Union for some reason or another in the initial years after independence but this was early on. Secondly, I don’t think that many Brits would have regarded Americans at the time as ‘English’ in the same way that they were; again similarities with the native-born colonists in Spanish America is instructive, while they came from the same culture and national stock; I think most English particularly the middle classes and the aristocratic elites would have regarded the colonialists as a related but distinct part of the English social system of gradation. One can see this in that the reactions towards the original English Revolution and indigenous radicalism was rather different than American radicalism’s more supportive reactions from within its own ranks.

The revolution of 1861 was a falangist one, and the first movers were the one-party states (what Anderson calls "impeccable democratic majorities"); in fact, for years a festering problem has been the fact that the slavocracy had power but no representation amongst the better part of its population: of 5 million whites and four million slaves on the eve of the ACW, only 2 million were in the class that could vote (so—about half a million voters for the entire 12-state population of 9 million). This is not an impeccable democratic majority.

Perhaps he means by the standards of the time; after all it was constitutionally sanctioned provisions that restricted the ability of Blacks to count as voters and citizens and I think only two northern states granted Free Blacks these rights and these were states which had an inconsequential free Black population - this was simply the attitude of the time. Democratic majority here would mean that of the sanctioned electorate - one that in another exclusion would exclude women for a while as yet (nobody impugns the democratic nature of democracies that had not yet granted women the vote compared to non-democracies at the time).

Everytime a country or organization changes its policy on an important issue, however, it's not the vanguards with the maximalist position who are in charge. What you have is tug of war, with the midpoint of the rope inching along. The POTUS is never supposed to be an ideologue; he's supposed to be a facilitator and referee. Lincoln was the best one of these we've ever had.

I agree that in theory this is how he was meant to be seen; I suppose the Presidency became more internvetionist after FDR and the interwar period.

I'm really sorry I can't address this suject properly right now, Conrad. I've already spent far too much time and it is OT. It merits another post. It must be admitted, though, that Lincoln is part of my personal pantheon—someone I revere beyond expression.

I look forward to this, I haven’t anything against Lincoln and I admire him as well; though for different reasons than you and most Americans I think. I just feel that one shouldn’t read things into Lincoln’c character or role that were simply not there. This would do a disservice to the man, indubitably one of the greatest American Presidents.

The remark about "British Marxist = monarchist": I don't meant they all admire the Hanoverians!

I think my point was that most of the British Marxists I know and have read detested the monarchy in its Stuart, Victorian, Edwardian and modern guises. I don’t understand where you got the idea that they had any love for the British monarchy in any of its historical manifestations; they are for the most part hardcore republicans and anti-monarchists.

Posted by: Conrad Barwa at August 6, 2004 01:44 AM