![]() |
|||||
![]() |
|||||
|
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
The Biology of Totalitarianism(Fascism & Falangism page; initially posted at The Watch)Orcinus, whom everyone should read, cites Robert O. Paxton’s essay "The Five Stages of Fascism," The Journal of Modern History, March 1998. Paxton identifies five stages in fascism's arc of flight: 1. The initial creation of fascist movementsThis is a little different from falangism: 1. The initial creation of component movements (explained below)(“Component movements” are organizations with diverse interests and ideologies, but a common goal. Consider, for example, Christopher Hitchens and Jerry Falwell: entirely dissimilar, but each favoring the Iraqi Invasion). By "passion," I mean some intense bloody crisis, such as Pinochet's coup. Falangist
movements are generically different from fascism in two ways: their
origin can be traced to one of many potential groups; fascist movements
suffer violent mutual antipathies. For example, in Austria, 1934, the
fascist chancellor Dollfuss was taken hostage in his office and
murdered by Austrian Nazis. More famous is the February 26th (1936)
incident in Japan described vividly in the opening chapter of John
Toland’s outstanding Rising Sun, in which the Imperial Way
faction sought to seize control of the government. Suppressed by
regular troops, it opened the way for Tojo Hidekei’s Control Faction to
establish a totalitarian state. The other big difference is
that countries drift into fascism; falangism comes with a bloodbath.
Falangism implodes, discredited; fascism descends into a blood-dimmed
tide, like WW2 or civil war. The violence of the February 26th Incident
was limited in scope; seven officials, including the great economist
Takehashi Korekiyo, were assassinated. The “Night of the Long Knives”
occurred almost eight months after the Nazi Party had secured a
political monopoly). Had one been alive at the time, and an
experienced observer of parliamentary politics, the ascent of the
fascists would have seemed a farce. The maneuvers in the Reichstag and
the parliaments of Hungary, Austria, Romania… all were guided by helplessness and denial on the part of the elites. These were almost to a man, ultra-conservatives and aristocrats. In Germany, coalitions of every other party had desperately shut out the Communists; now a coalition excluding the Communists and the Nazis was impossible, and the Nazis were not a normal political party. Chancellor Von Papen and conservative kingpin Schleicher, along with a cabal of financiers, therefore, pushed through a “joint government” with Adolf Hitler as a stopgap measure (23 Jan 1933). After that, Hitler subordinated his reluctant, aristocratic patrons. While the Nazis were unusual even for fascists in their ruthlessness, the ascent to power of other fascist groups was fairly similar. In all cases, foreign pressures were decisive. Compare this to the ascent of falangist movements: in Brazil (1964), Chile (1973), Argentina (1976), there was a bloody coup d’état and a civil war. In Spain, Gen. Franco’s golpe touched off a war that killed nearly 365,000 people. Foreign intervention in the scores and scores of falangist coups, putsches, golpes, and other horrors have been influential once the killing began. Although allegations fly about CIA involvement in this or that coup, my
own research has led me to suspect that in the majority of cases
foreign intervention was opportunistic rather than causative. In
general, falangist movements are extremely xenophobic and inward
looking, focused narrowly on internal enemies. Fascist movements are not obviously civil wars; falangist regimes obviously are, even though the enemy of the falangist regime is to be found everywhere. This brings us back to my original quandary: how relevant is the above to our present situation in this country? The
answer is, “More than you might suppose.” Fascist movements arise
gradually and require homogeneity to triumph. A splintered fascist
movement is unlikely to get to first base; I cannot find a single
example of a fascist regime arising from a multiplicity of fascist
groups. That, in it, is encouraging. The heterogeneity of American
would-be fascists is astonishing, and becoming more so. But this is no
protection against falangism. Falangism is organizationally
polyzygomatic; it always arises with a host of supporting
organizations. These can espouse the prevailing religion, or reject it;
they can be market fundamentalists, or they can be business
nationalists. Hatred of liberalism (in the political sense of the term)
is a necessary and sufficient condition. A proliferation of
(potentially rival) militia is not a problem for falangism; it is a
problem for fascists. Mistrust of the government and a denigration of
it are obstacles for fascists, but never for falangists. Another
anxiety is the suddenness of the onset. Countries drift into fascism;
but falangism arises from a violent crisis - a coup, usually preceded
by extreme civil breakdown. The difference between America’s response
in 1930 to the onset of the Great Depression, and that of other nations
to the same crisis, has a lot to do with the relative trust with which
political participants regard each other. Fascist Architecture Ceacescu’s palace of the people American control group Falangist Architecture |